{"id":42,"date":"2020-11-05T09:24:23","date_gmt":"2020-11-05T14:24:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/?page_id=42"},"modified":"2020-12-19T18:13:33","modified_gmt":"2020-12-19T23:13:33","slug":"expert-opinions","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/expert-opinions\/","title":{"rendered":"Expert Opinions"},"content":{"rendered":"
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(Grimes, 2016)<\/p><\/div>\n

For the historical analysis section, Schelling, Cohn, Walzer, Mack, and Hammes were useful to our argument about the import<\/span><\/span>ance of <\/span>learning from mistakes the US has made. Schelling\u2019s ideas on the strategic logic were used when discussing the strategic logic behind bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Schelling argues that politics drives military action and he differentiates between the direct use of force and the indirect use of force: with the direct use of force, the purpose is to destroy a physical target, while the indirect use of force\u2019s purpose is to send a message. According to Schelling, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the indirect use of force, where the purpose was to send a message to Tokyo. Additionally, part of Cohn\u2019s arguments was used when discussing how leaders justify using nuclear weapons. She argues that the people that justify the use of nuclear weapons do not bear the brunt of the human suffering that comes from them. This argument was used when discussing the Damascus Incident, as government officials are often so focused on developing nuclear weapons, that it is easy to overlook the consequences or accidents that occur with such dangerous material. Further, Walzer\u2019s arguments about \u201cJust War” and the\u201cusefulness of morality\u201d were relevant to US military aggre<\/span>ssion in the Vietnam war. Walzer argues that states will be undermined if they act unjustly in war, especially since the media puts the spotlight on immoral acts. Therefore, Walzer\u2019s ideas were relevant to US strategy in Vietnam, which relied on technology and ultimately overlooked the human aspect of war. Additionally, Mack\u2019s thoughts on unconventional warfare being key to success was relevant to the discussion on the US\u2019 conventional strategy during Vietnam. Mack argued that the key to winning a war is by attacking the will of the adversary rather than relying on superior weapons and brute force. The Vietnam War serves as an example of Mack\u2019s argument where military superiority was not key to success. Lastly, Hammes was useful in discussing the Vietnam War, as he emphasizes the strategy of 4<\/span>th<\/span> Generation Warfare and explains why the US lost in Vietnam.<\/span><\/p>\n

For the counterargument section, Broad, Byman, Lazer, Polyakova, Singer, and Stern were useful in determining the opposing argument. William Broad, of the New York Times, illuminated some of the ambiguity that surrounds the Stuxnet virus that plagued Iran\u2019s nuclear centrifuges. Daniel Byman, a proponent of drone warfare, makes many claims regarding how the use of drones can alter and be beneficial for U.S. strategy abroad. David Lazer writes on how fake news, propagated by tech companies like Facebook, has affected the U.S. political landscape. Outside forces meddling in U.S. elections, via fake news, is a grave security threat. Alina Polyakova\u2019s paper further highlights this threat posed by cyber interference in U.S. political practices. She speaks to how failed U.S. responses empower other foreign entities which leads to an even greater security threat. W.P. Singer, in his article on cyberspace, argues for how interconnected the world has become since the proliferation of internet connections and web data. This interconnectedness poses a security risk for nations that are dependent on the internet and web services. Finally, Jeffrey Stern describes the accuracy of cyber weapons. His argument primarily frames the problems with precision bombs, but in the context of this website, his point about how accurate the weapons are is useful in discussing advanced weaponry and how it might be used to increase international security.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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(Nagl, 2009)<\/p><\/div>\n

The Policy Suggestion section was influenced by the work of John A. Nagl. Nagl\u2019s article, \u201cLet\u2019s Win the Wars We\u2019re In,\u201d highlights the US military\u2019s strategic shortcomings in irregular conflicts in the past and present. Our group\u2019s main argument is in alignment with Nagl\u2019s positionality, that to make informed decisions in present and future military operations it\u2019s vital to look at history for guidance. Nagl\u2019s response to critics who disapprove of the investment of COIN operations is: historically, the US has been involved in more \u201cCOIN and nation building missions than full-scale war\u201d and that \u201ctrends such as the youth bulge and urbanization in underdeveloped states, as well as the proliferation of more lethal weaponry, point to a future dominated by chaotic local insecurity conflict rather than confrontations between the armies and navies of nation-states.\u201d Therefore, implementing COIN strategies will serve the military in the future. Nagl also counters critics’ claims by expressing another flaw in the US military which is prioritizing the hypothetical future \u201cbig war\u201d conflicts rather than addressing the present irregular conflicts. Neglecting current conflicts will only prolong them; therefore, increasing the time, money, and lives spent on the present issues. <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

For the historical analysis section, Schelling, Cohn, Walzer, Mack, and Hammes were useful to our argument about the importance of learning from mistakes the US has made. Schelling\u2019s ideas on the strategic logic were used when discussing the strategic logic behind bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Schelling argues that politics drives military action and he differentiates […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-42","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/42","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=42"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/42\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/government-legal-studies-2680-fall-2020-the-professionals\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=42"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}