{"id":37,"date":"2020-11-05T09:22:02","date_gmt":"2020-11-05T14:22:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/?page_id=37"},"modified":"2020-12-21T21:26:07","modified_gmt":"2020-12-22T02:26:07","slug":"narrative-of-the-event","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/narrative-of-the-event\/","title":{"rendered":"Narrative of the Event"},"content":{"rendered":"

In 1977 with the completion of the trans-Alaska pipeline and the Valdez tanker terminal, a new system of oil transportation that promised to quench America\u2019s appetite for fossil fuels and mitigate its reliance on Middle Eastern resources had been established. During its initial 12 years, the system was a huge success as tankers safely transited the Prince William Sound more than 8,700 times and transported around 2 million barrels of oil from the Alaskan pipeline into the American markets every day. Yet, despite its successful track record, the Valdez transportation system was permeated by lax governmental oversight and corporate disregard for safety protocols.<\/p>\n

March 24th<\/sup>, 1989: The Grounding of the Exxon Valdez\u00a0 \u00a0 <\/strong><\/p>\n

Around 9 pm on March 23rd<\/sup>, 1989, the Exxon Valdez, carrying over 53 million gallons of North Slope crude oil, left the Alyeska pipeline and began its journey towards Long Beach, California. As the boat had made its way through the Valdez Narrow at 11:30 pm, Captain Hazelwood, the person in command of the tanker, increased the speed of the boat and informed the Vessel Traffic Center that \u201cwe\u2019ll probably divert from the TTS [traffic separation scheme] and end up in the inbound traffic lane.\u201d As it was later learned, Hazelwood\u2019s decision to deviate from the inbound navigation lane was done in order to avoid hitting small icebergs from the nearby glacier\u2013\u2013icebergs which tankers can push through safely if they reduce their speed.<\/p>\n

\"\"
Tracks the course of the tanker on the night of the grounding (AOSC Report [1]).<\/figcaption><\/figure>Ten minutes later, Hazelwood left the ship\u2019s bridge and went down to his chambers, leaving the ship under the command of a third mate and his helmsman (the person who steers the ship), crew members were not qualified to command the vessel under maritime law. For the next 20 minutes as the tanker continued its southern course crossing theouter limits of the navigation lane and approaching the Bligh Island shore, neither the mate nor helmsman ordered a course change. This lapsus in judgment was likely due to fatigue and inexperience. At this point, the mate and helmsman (the only officers on duty) had been awake and working for 18 hours straight.<\/p>\n

At midnight, the mate spotted waring lights from Blight Beef and attempted to re-steer the ship to avoid the shallows, but it was too late. Seven minutes later, at 00:07, the Exxon Valdez made contact with Blight Reef. Hazelwood, who at this point had been called back to the bridge, radioed the traffic center at Valdez: \u201cWe are fetched up, ah, hard aground\u2026evidently leaking some oil.\u201d<\/p>\n

First-Response: The Clean-Up Fiasco\u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Within twenty minutes of Hazelwood\u2019s communication, the Alyeska Piper Service Company\u2013\u2013the corporation in charge of the initial clean-up response\u2013\u2013was notified of the accident. Even though Alyeska\u2019s contingency plan had estimated that it would take them around five hours to respond to an oil spill in the region, on the night of the disaster it took them over 14 hours. The delayed response time of the Alyeska was the result of a lack of preparation. Most of the Alyeska\u2019s clean-up material was either missing or covered in several feet of snow, their 126-foot flat-deck trailer designed to move equipment during spill disasters was out of service and unloaded, and none of the employees working at the time were qualified to operate the forklifts required to move the equipment around. Alyeska\u2019s clean-up response was a total failure.<\/p>\n

\"\"
This graph demonstrates the huge gap between Alyeska’s contingency plan and their actual clean-up capabilities at the night of the disaster(AOSC Report [2]).<\/figcaption><\/figure>The next day, Exxon\u2013\u2013the corporation that was legally and financially responsible for the oil spill\u2013\u2013decided to take charge of the response efforts. Alyeska agreed to hand over control. This was controversial because unlike Alyeska, whose contingency plan had been reviewed and approved by the state agency and the U.S. Coast Guard, Exxon was under no obligation to comply with state demands as to how to conduct the clean-up effort. Furthermore, the Exxon take-over caused as a lot of confusion over who was in charge and further hindered the efficacy of the clean-up efforts.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\"\"
These picture outline some of the methods and equipment used to respond to oil Spills at sea(EPA Website).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In an attempt to mitigate the impacts of the oil spill, Exxon quickly hired a private company to supply clean-up labor and material equipment. Despite their best efforts, Exxon was unable to collect the necessary oil containment equipment fast enough to stem the dispersion of the oil and engage in situ burning (see image). The initial attempt to contain the oil spill and prevent it from spreading across theGulf of Alaska had failed\u2013\u2013the oil spill, which had spread thousands of miles, was now everywhere. Over the next couple of months, Exxon hired cleanup workers and local volunteers who skimmed oil from the water\u2019s surface, washed oiled beaches with water hoses and cleaned animals trapped in oil. Yet, despite spending $2 billion on cleanup costs, Exxon\u2019s efforts only removed around 3% of the total oil spilled and were deemed ineffective.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Aftermath: The Devastation of the Local Communities <\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the aftermath of the disaster, the local communities of the Alaskan Gulf were devastated. As the oil spill spread and reached the shores, the land and waters by which these communities lived and relied on became toxic dumps. Furthermore, the influx of people that came to the area during the clean-up effort\u2013\u2013reporters, out-of-state clean-up workers, and Exxon personnel\u2013\u2013further exacerbated the hardship of the disaster. While the effects of the oil spill affected communities differently, Alaskans from all walks of life experienced economic loss, psychological trauma, and dislocation as result of the disaster.<\/p>\n

\"(Anchorage
People carry signs to protest the Exxon oil spill in Anchorage, Alaska on May 27, 1989 (AOSC, photo gallery).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In 1977 with the completion of the trans-Alaska pipeline and the Valdez tanker terminal, a new system of oil transportation that promised to quench America\u2019s appetite for fossil fuels and mitigate its reliance on Middle Eastern resources had been established. During its initial 12 years, the system was a huge success as tankers safely transited … Continue reading “Narrative of the Event”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-37","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/37","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/37\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-abaselga\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}