{"id":54,"date":"2020-11-05T09:26:13","date_gmt":"2020-11-05T14:26:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/?page_id=54"},"modified":"2020-12-22T02:01:04","modified_gmt":"2020-12-22T07:01:04","slug":"your-choosing-ii","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/your-choosing-ii\/","title":{"rendered":"TMI in Media"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Nuclear technology first entered the world in a shroud of secrecy and uncertainty.\u00a0 Impetus for the creation of the first atomic bomb was as much scientific as it was the result of rampant speculation that the Nazis were developing atomic capability of their own.\u00a0 The United States\u2019 first major nuclear effort, the Manhattan project, was likewise highly confidential.\u00a0 And when the Cold War fomented public apprehension about nuclear technology on a national scale, the public fantasy around nuclear energy grew even more lurid (Wills 2006, 120).<\/p>\n<p>The secrecy surrounding \u201cnuclear energy\u201d \u2013 whatever that was \u2013 ensured that media portrayals of the technology would have an outsize ability to frame public attitudes and expectations around it (Wills 2006, 109).\u00a0 When the public raced to grasp the ramifications of the TMI disaster in its messy, ambiguous aftermath, then, the media they consumed had a large effect on their understanding of the disaster.<\/p>\n<p><strong>A Blockbuster Coincidence<\/strong><\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_132\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-132\" style=\"width: 208px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-medium wp-image-132\" src=\"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/456\/2020\/12\/China-Syndrome-208x300.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"208\" height=\"300\" srcset=\"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/456\/2020\/12\/China-Syndrome-208x300.jpg 208w, https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/456\/2020\/12\/China-Syndrome.jpg 329w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 208px) 85vw, 208px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-132\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Cover art for The China Syndrome. (2)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>A mere twelve days before the TMI-2 reactor suffered a partial meltdown, Hollywood thriller <em>The China Syndrome<\/em> landed in theaters nationwide.\u00a0 The film, starring Jane Fonda and Michael Douglas, portrays a television reporter\u2019s intrepid investigation of a fictional nuclear power plant in California.\u00a0 Everything that can go wrong at the plant does, and Fonda\u2019s character is left to witness a harrowing nuclear disaster in the making.\u00a0 Producers of the highly dramatized movie drew on documented instances of corruption and misfortune at real-life US nuclear facilities, and the film\u2019s portrayal of these facilities was not kind \u2013 energy utilities were framed as mischievous tricksters that valued profit over safety, and nuclear employees were made out to be grossly negligent in maintaining order at the California plant.\u00a0 Federal authorities, too, were cast in an unflattering light, depicted as bumbling and inept in\u00a0responding to nuclear crisis (Wills 2006, 111-12).<\/p>\n<p><em>The China Syndrome<\/em> was already poised to take advantage of growing public distrust of nuclear energy in the 70s, but when TMI-2 melted down mere days after the movie\u2019s release, the film enjoyed the brightest spotlight imaginable.\u00a0 As much of the American public attempted to make sense of the accident, the version of nuclear power the movie portrayed proved vivid in the collective imagination.\u00a0 Those uncertain of how to respond to the TMI accident looked to <em>The China Syndrome<\/em> as a frame of reference for unfamiliar technology (Wills 2006, 114).<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u201cThis Whole F*cking Thing was Produced by Jane Fonda!\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The national news media was not immune to the allure of <em>The China Syndrome<\/em>.\u00a0 The movie provided accessible and palatable information to a press corps no likelier to possess nuclear expertise than the American public writ large.\u00a0 Reporters were known to attend showings of the film near Middletown, touting it as their \u201cinside view\u201d of the disaster (Wills 2006, 116).<\/p>\n<p>It should come as no surprise, then, that the media tended to conflate Hollywood with reality.\u00a0 <em>Time<\/em> and <em>Newsweek<\/em> both drew explicit parallels to <em>The China Syndrome<\/em> in their reporting, and media outlets did not successfully distinguish the response of the movie\u2019s fictional energy company, California Gas and Electric, from that of Met Ed (Mazur 1984, 60).\u00a0 The media reporting on the accident transposed much of CGE\u2019s malice and manipulation onto Met Ed \u2013 and while Met Ed did have some issues with transparency and availability, its shortcomings were nowhere near Hollywood\u2019s portrayal (Wills 2006, 116).\u00a0 In a similar manner, federal authorities like the NRC struggled to shed the bumbling and inept image the media had saddled them with (Wills 2006, 117).<\/p>\n<p>All too easily, public reactions to the accident veered toward alarmism and panic as <em>The China<\/em> Syndrome set public expectations for the disaster\u2019s mitigation efforts.\u00a0 The film proved so popular that an executive at the Atomic Industrial Forum, while referring to the drama surrounding TMI, quipped that \u201cthis whole f*cking thing was produced by Jane Fonda!\u201d (Wills 2006, 117)<\/p>\n<p><strong>The News Media Struggles<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The missteps taken by the national news media did not end with its overwrought focus on <em>The China Syndrome<\/em>.\u00a0 The media\u2019s responsibility was immense: coverage of the TMI accident consumed nearly 40% of evening news during the first week as the public frantically searched for accurate information about the disaster (Mazur 1984, 45).\u00a0 And in some key ways, the media failed to meet its responsibility.<\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"March 28, 1979\u200b: \u200b\u200b\u200bThree Mile Island nuclear power plant accident\" width=\"840\" height=\"473\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/Ev6IJOlROto?feature=oembed\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>Much of the media\u2019s struggles were outside of its own control.\u00a0 The radioactive TMI reactor was necessarily shielded from public access, creating a crisis of visibility in which the entire nation grew more desperate for information about something they could not see (Zaretsky 2018, 72).\u00a0 Moreover, the convoluted and highly technical nature of nuclear energy, combined with initial uncertainty among experts about the seriousness of the disaster, came into direct conflict with the pressure for immediate reporting (Nelkin 1981, 139).\u00a0 Journalists with no prior knowledge of nuclear power were suddenly tasked with making it digestible for an entire nation.<\/p>\n<p>A harrowing example of the dangers of media hype came with the hydrogen bubble scare, which first emerged on the Friday after the initial meltdown.\u00a0 An employee at the NRC phoned the Associated Press with a dire warning: the bubble, he said, might soon explode.\u00a0 The AP promptly published a story, only for experts to confirm two days later that the bubble presented no danger to the surrounding area.\u00a0 The news media got it wrong, but it\u2019s worth noting that the erroneous information originated with the NRC.\u00a0 This proved to be a pattern, as journalists gave generally accurate reports, with most factual errors traceable to government and business sources of information (Mazur 1984, 60).<\/p>\n<p><strong>Imprint on the Public Consciousness<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The nuclear accident at Three Mile Island proved highly consequential for the way it shifted public impressions of nuclear energy, and much of this shift is attributable to the way the media constructed the technology for Americans in the aftermath of the disaster.\u00a0 Between <em>The China Syndrome<\/em> and the relative accessibility of the Middletown, PA area to journalists, TMI \u00a0happened at the right place and time to become the center of public attention (Mazur 1984, 48).<\/p>\n<p>The national attitude toward nuclear power was directly affected by the quantity of media coverage.\u00a0 Public opposition to controversial technology generally correlates with increased journalistic attention to that technology, and TMI was no exception (Mazur 1984, 64).\u00a0 Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ), chairman of a House subcommittee on energy observed later that the \u201cincredibly optimistic\u201d view toward nuclear technology of the 50s and 60s had been dramatically shaken by events at TMI (Carter 1979, 155).\u00a0 Indeed, the combination of <em>The China Syndrome<\/em> and TMI, a mere 12 days apart, fostered public dialogue about nuclear energy, which in turn drove a surge in political activism (Wills 2006, 118).<\/p>\n<p>As the founder of advocacy group People Against Nuclear Energy proclaimed after the accident, \u201cwe\u2019ve borne our share of the nuclear experiment\u201d (Walsh 1981, 9).\u00a0 The American public had revealed the secrets of nuclear energy, and decided that the technology was better suited for works of fiction.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Nuclear technology first entered the world in a shroud of secrecy and uncertainty.\u00a0 Impetus for the creation of the first atomic bomb was as much scientific as it was the result of rampant speculation that the Nazis were developing atomic capability of their own.\u00a0 The United States\u2019 first major nuclear effort, the Manhattan project, was &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/your-choosing-ii\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;TMI in Media&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-54","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/54","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=54"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/54\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/courses.bowdoin.edu\/history-2203-fall-2020-wbuschin\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=54"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}