Technological Momentum and System Failure

“Many people in the [Soviet nuclear energy] industry had to make difficult decisions under great uncertainty, and when they know they couldn’t achieve the optimum solution, zero risk, they tried to at least reduce the risk they saw” (Schmid et al. 2015, 127).

Nikita Khrushchev and “Russia the New Direction” Time Magazine cover from November 30, 1953 (“Nikita Khrushchev” 1953).

After Joseph Stalin died in March 1953, Nikita Khrushchev rose to power in the USSR. In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev placed greater emphasis on openness, particularly in regard to modern science and technology. Under Khrushchev, “scientists were part of a new postwar technocratic elite,” and the notion “atoms for peace” quickly gained prominence as the USSR explored nuclear technology for civilian energy production (Josephson 2005, 1-4). In the USSR, atoms for peace and the nuclear energy project were popularized as a great contrast to the United States, which had recently dropped atomic bombs on Japan in 1945. Additionally, the nuclear energy industry symbolized modernism and progressivism in the post-Stalinist USSR (Josephson 2005, 4-5) . These cultural conditions led to the widely held belief among Communist Party elites that nuclear technologies were “infallible and manipulable by the simple worker” (Josephson 2005, 2). As a result, nuclear energy seemed to be the perfect way to power the communist state, and in the backdrop of the Cold War, much emphasis was placed on advancement of nuclear technologies for the betterment of the USSR.

Although nuclear power had the potential to produce large amounts of clean energy making nuclear power economically competitive with fossil fuels was challenging due to the high cost of constructing nuclear power plants. One, of the two primary types of reactors that the Soviets built, was the channel-graphite model, otherwise known as the RBMK. This reactor design was based off of the first nuclear power reactor, Obninsk, which opened in 1954 (Josephson 2005, 8-9). The RBMK reactor was particularly advantageous to the Soviets because it was cheaper to construct than pressurized water reactors (PWRs), which were popular in the West, and because it was more energy efficient (Filburn 2016, 55-56). By spending less on nuclear plant production and using more energy efficient technology, the USSR was able to make nuclear power more economically comparable to fossil fuels.

Schematic of the RBMK 1000 nuclear reactor. Key to the design was lack of a containment structure surrounding the reactor. Diagram from Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima: Curse of the Nuclear Genie (Filburn 2016, 57).

Unfortunately, these very characteristics that make RBMK cheaper and more energy efficient reduce the safety of RBMK reactors. Unlike PWR reactors, which use negative core power feedback coefficients that automatically reduce core power, RBMK reactors used positive core power feedback coefficients, which automatically increase core power, under certain conditions. This critical difference makes RBMK reactors less safe because losing control of the core power level is much easier given that the reactors automatic systems tend to increase core power (Filburn 2016, 56-59). As it turns out, operators at the Chernobyl plant lost control when reactor No. 4 was operating under positive core power feedback conditions, so the reactor core was overpowered and subsequently melted-down (Filburn 2016, 62). Chernobyl, once a symbol of modern science and triumph in the USSR, clearly displayed safety flaws in the RBMK reactor design.

Flaws in the RBMK reactor design were not the only technological issues that plagued Chernobyl—and most of the USSR. Chernobyl’s first four reactors opened between 1977-1983, and during their construction and openings there were major shortages of skilled labor and high quality materials (Marples 1987, 325). Most plant employees were under-skilled, and they had neither the experience nor the technical background to respond to issues as they arose. Reactors No. 1 and No. 2 has opened in 1977 and 1978 five-six years before reactor No. 4 opened, but the majority of the plant operators who gained experience working at reactors No. 1 and No. 2 had been transferred to other plants throughout the USSR (Marples 1987, 325). As the safety test on reactor No. 4 began to deviate from the original plan, Chernobyl operators did not have sufficient knowledge of the complex systems—designed by nuclear physicists, chemists and engineers—to manage the reactors power during the test.

Operators managing one of the Chernobyl reactors in 1986 (Taylor 2019).

Overall, the combination of design flaws in RBMK reactors and an unskilled labor force led to loss of control at Chernobyl’s reactor No. 4. Even though many in the Soviet nuclear power industry were aware of fundamental design flaws, systems became so complex that there was no reasonable way to address all potential issues (Schmid et al. 2015, 127). In many large-scale industrial accidents, complex technological systems that house “large amounts of potentially hazardous materials” are managed by a relatively small number of individuals (Meshkati 1991, 134). As technology advances overtime, these systems become exponentially more complex, and an error in a single facet of the system can have a cascading effect that is ultimately devastating.

At Chernobyl, human error during the safety test combined with an unsafe reactor design resulted in complete loss of control of the system and radioactive fallout across Europe. Industrial accidents often appear extraordinary, but human and technological failures in complex systems are a matter of when, not if. Ultimately, as issues within these systems become more difficult to address, calamitous disasters become more probable.