In “Race, Class, and Politics in the Cappuccino City,” Hyra examines the gentrification of the Washington D.C., specifically focusing on the redevelopment of Shaw/U Street, a historically black neighborhood. In its heyday, the neighborhood was known to be a cultural and economic center of DC’s black community. The area later began to decline and soon became known as a Black ghetto. However, with new White, middle-class workers moving in, the area has started to redevelop. This introduction of a socioeconomically different class of residents has raised cultural and political divisions and issues within the neighborhood. While gentrification has helped revitalize Shaw/U Street, the new White residents have started to push out long-time Black residents through economic, political, and cultural suffocation. Long-term residents also become marginalized as their image and stereotypes are marketed towards to and reinforced by these White newcomers. This Black branding is detrimental to closing the social gap between the two groups, and the marginalization of poor Black residents has further racially and economically separated the community.

As we discussed during class, White incomers have taken the opportunity to profit off Shaw/U Street’s Black culture. Instead of treating the Black community as alive, developers and new residents market the Black ghetto stereotypes, grabbing the aura of “coolness” associated with “living the wire.” Developers also solidify Black branding through historic preservation. This form of Black branding, however, was to make the area more palatable to White residents. Focusing on the Black Broadway days to sanitize yet further reinforce the coolness of Black culture, developers highlight the city’s Black cultural legacy while ignoring the current community. This branding places a degree of separation between the new and old residents. Blacks become living stereotypes, things that White residents avoid in public yet mimic and relish among themselves.

This divide and the problems raised by Black branding inspired my expert questions. I wondered how low-income minority communities could receive more of gentrification’s economic benefits as the Hyra portrays the divide between the poor and middle-class as stagnant, if not growing. The new jobs are either low-skill, service labor, which mostly prevents economic mobility, and high-skill, creative jobs which are following a base of college-educated, young professionals. These industries do not focus on bridging the gap rather than reinforce it. This economic concern raises the question of voice. Black institutions and amenities such as churches and basketball courts give way for dog parks and White-owned go-go restaurants. With development focused on catering to the well-off White incomers, the opinions of the long-term, Black residents are left unheard.

Finding a voice for the increasingly marginalized long-term, black community involves examining Black branding. Hyra challenges the notion that such branding could be helpful to the Black residents; in class, we discussed the issues raised by new residents appropriating only specific, “cool” parts of Black culture. While the class leaned against this culture vulturism, the solutions seemed sparse. The group regarded the 40 oz. Roses as a negative ghetto stereotype, but Baby Wale raises some thoughts. Albeit not an authentic go-go place, Baby Wale seeks to preserve a culture in a generally respectful way. Can non-Black people take any components of Black culture without reinforcing Black branding? The new White incomers claim to be inspired by Shaw/U Street’s unique Black culture; an unsanitized version of “living the wire” could scare potential residents with money to add to the community. How can the area attract middle-class, White residents who can help redevelop the region while maintaining its cultural heritage?

Preserving the community’s legacy requires retaining its declining, long-term Black residents. Without the Black residents who define the culture that attracts the new migrants, the area would lose some of its attraction. Solutions proposed to counteract the declining population was access to affordable, subsidized housing as well as rent control and equal investments in various city amenities. These would help long-term residents to maintain a presence in the area. While Shaw/U Street reflects more of a gilded ghetto, these changes could help shift the area to more align with Anderson’s cosmopolitan canopy. A place for meaningful interactions, however, requires modifications to close the racial and economic gap, which divides the foam from the coffee in this cappuccino city.

In his essay “Places of Privileged Consumption Practices”, Centner observes the impact dot-comers can have on an area with their privileged consumption. Dot-comers are able to exercise spatial capital over the local residents and drive gentrification in San Francisco. The class before this discussion we read “The City as a Growth Machine” in John R. Logan’s book Urban Fortunes. Reading about privileged consumption and the growth machine made it seem like the people driving gentrification were completely in control, and hold a lot more power than local residents. This prompted me to ask if local residents had any power over these groups and how they could reclaim some power from these groups.

My classmates were able to bring up great examples of the community coming together to keep their neighborhoods from being gentrified. The examples of the street art in San Francisco and fighting back against noise complaints in DC stood out to me, but still left some questions. If there is good economic incentive in gentrifying a neighborhood for stake holders, will these efforts be enough to keep the neighborhood from changing? People driving gentrification in these neighborhoods have overwhelmingly more resources to get what they want. How do people in these neighborhoods access a level of resources that could put up a fight against the growth machine or privileged consumers?

I understand that people can have spatial capital through means other than economics, but I wonder when there is a clash to stake a claim on a space, could someone win without the economic advantage? In Kidder’s work on parkour we see that people can exercise spatial capital by being in a place with a group, practicing their sport. If someone with political or economic power wanted to forbid parkour in this area they could use their resources to implement rules forbidding the sport or change the place to make it less desirable to do parkour. I see this hypothetical being a similar case to a neighborhood, in which privileged consumers and the growth machine find desirable. People invested in changing these communities have the power to buy properties in the neighborhood. With their economic power, gentrifiers can make their presence felt in a community and start the process of driving out local residents.

We see the process of money driving gentrification in a neighborhood repeat itself with super-gentrification. Middle-class people that came in to the neighborhood and forced people out with their resources, are being kicked out by people with even more resources than the first wave of gentrifiers. This progression of neighborhood gentrification makes it seem like economic capital is the decision-making factor in a community becoming gentrified or not. Is my analysis of the issue too pessimistic? Is there some aspect of this clash for claim over space that I am overlooking? Can people make a claim on a neighborhood through non-economic means that will not be taken over by people who have spatial capital through economic means?

In “Places of Privileged Consumption: Spatial Capital, the Dot-Com Habitus, and San Francisco’s Internet Boom,” Ryan Centner interviews dot-com workers in San Francisco and examines how their spatialized consumption practices formed exclusionary places of privilege during the city’s millennial boom of internet companies. “In Parkour and the City: Risk, Masculinity, and the Meaning in a Postmodern Space, Jeffrey Kidder examines the growth of the sport Parkour and the phenomenon of a globalized community via the internet. Spatial capital as defined by Ryan Centner is “the capacity to stake exclusionary claims, perceived by others as socially legitimate, on urban space that could reasonably be open to others who were not participating in the new economy.” Both readings analyze the different ways both the dot-com workers and Parkour traceurs seem to claim spatial capital.

There was a distinct difference in definition between “space” and “place” as noted in Kidder’s writing, which prompted my expert question of considering different community “places” we have read about, and what these communities have done to build their “place.” Spaces are able to be transformed into many different places through different motives and different ideas. In response to my question I posed regarding different community “places” we have read about, a student immediately brought up the defined communities in Vargas’ Wounded City. Many of the unexpected alliances created were there to produce and maintain social order, but all also seemed to create a sense of community in an unorthodox fashion. These gangs claimed spatial capital through turf wars and social capital through the unspoken social legitimacy of the “code of silence.” This is a stark contrast to the gentrification of dot-com workers and Parkour participants. Dot-com residents seem to be self-segregating themselves, only networking to those who are similar. These strong ties being formed connect to our class’ lecture in the fact that this leads to further fragmentation due to their exclusivity, and thus inevitability changes the cultural dynamics of spatial capital spaces. They in a way are similar to Chicago’s gang places in the idea that these places are becoming more about “who you know”, rather than a shared sense of “what you know.” Would one consider the dot-com residents a form of supergentrifiers, an idea discussed in class?

An interesting change noted with the rise of Parkour is that people are not necessarily forming communities the same way. The relationships created through these online communities offset the declining significance of place, or rather the cultural significance attributed to spaces. I find it extremely interesting that networks of interpersonal ties could provide such a sense of belonging to a social identity, and people are no longer limited or restricted to neighborhood proximity. In the social media and internet realm of Parkour, this is considered a weak tie where information is quickly spread to a greater diversity of people. Social cohesion is maintained, through this feedback of virtual and reality worlds. I am wondering, however, to what extent can these online communities replace established communities purely based on a shared interest? These weak ties may fail to develop the commitment, trustworthiness and reciprocity that facilitates the maintenance of social capital. I wonder, is this rise of internet communities going to help us in the long run, or continue to emphasize superficiality?

For last week’s class, we read “The City as a Growth Machine” in Logan and Molotch’s Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place, and Loughran’s article “Parks for Profit: The High Line, Growth Machines, and the Uneven Development of Urban Spaces” in City & Community. In “The City as a Growth Machine,” Logan and Molotch examine the city as a “growth machine.” The growth that these authors refer to, is the economic impact that occurs as a result of the investment of elites, entrepreneurs, and business owners in cities, and the support that they receive from politicians. As these investments lead to the expansion of cities and the growth of the consumer base, the economic benefits yield profits for entrepreneurs and business owners. These investments into the city are also an opportunity for politicians to push forward their political agenda, and in some situations receive economic rewards from stakeholders to whom they show support.

My question for our class discussion, and the question that still lingers for me, is what agency do local residents have in urban growth. In our class discussion we identified that there is a clear power dynamic that exists when considering the ways in which cities grow, and that those atop the hierarchy benefit most from urban growth. This system, or “machine,” is maintained by these key stakeholders, and is perpetuated by their quest for continued economic advancement. Though they claim that growth in urban areas benefits all, theories of urban growth highlight the role that politics and government play, as well as the hierarchy and dynamics at play via capitalism, that advance the interests of the elite and leave many unrepresented and unheard. Though inclusion in decision making processes would solve the issue of residents being unheard, I am skeptical of the willingness of entrepreneurs, elites, and business owners to shift their focus to what residents want, if it does not yield economic opportunity.

Another theme that was raised in our class discussion was spatial capital. We discussed how residents can lay claim and power over space in their cities using the examples of parkour, and the spaces that residents in the San Francisco area have claimed as their own in “Places of Privileged Consumption Practices: Spatial Capital, the Dot-Com Habitus, and San Francisco’s Internet Boom.” Although these examples do provide counter narratives to the power dynamic that exists alongside urban growth and highlight resident agency, these examples only reflect the experiences of a select group of residents who are able to acquire social and cultural capital. These examples do not provide a response to how the socially and economically disadvantaged are represented.

In my initial question, my focus was on local residents. However, after our class discussion, I am more interested in how poorer communities are affected by urban growth and how those without social or economic capital can have input in regards to the changes in their cities. Though the hierarchy in cities and the political economy is not likely to change, politicians have the capacity to affect change, as they are able to speak on behalf of their residents, and ensuring that their voices are heard.

In “The City as a Growth Machine” from John R. Logan’s book Urban Fortunes, and Kevin Loughran’s paper “Parks for Profit”, the city is discussed and analyzed as a “growth machine”. This term refers to the way that the elites in cities benefit from economic growth and therefore structure cities’ political atmosphere to foster further growth. These articles made me think about the word “growth” and what it means for a city’s residents. While some groups within cities benefit greatly from economic growth, there are others that do not see these benefits in the same way. The poor members of a city may be hurt by a city’s economic growth as it can widen the economic and social gap between the wealthy and the poor. 

This thinking inspired the first part of my expert question of whether economic growth within a city means overall progress or not. Loughran’s paper highlights many problems associated with economic growth as it pertains to the urban poor. He uses the example of New York’s High Line to explain how investment in public spaces can exacerbate inequality within a city. Many of the inequality issues with public space pertains to accessibility. For example, many aspects of the New York’s High Line make it less accessible to the poor than to the wealthy. To enjoy the public space, residents first must be able to find it. While this seems as though it would be equally easy for all residents, that is not the case. Since the public space is meant to attract wealthier residents and tourists, it is well-known in these social circles, and far less known in lower class society. Other aspects of the High Line experience designate it as a privileged space. Examples of this include its excessive cleanliness, the removal of bottles so people cannot collect them, the $1000 application fee for vendors, the wealthy developments it overlooks, the members only section, and the list continues.  The issue stems from the political objective for economic growth. The goal is to attract elites and therefore the space is structured in a way that disproportionately benefits and appeals to a higher socioeconomic class. This phenomenon is true of many public spaces in cities, not just the High Line. 

The specific example of New York’s High Line is just one manifestation of the larger issue at hand, which is that economic growth of cities is structured in a way that disproportionately benefits the wealthy. This brings me to my second question of what we can do to foster growth that benefits all. The answers I got in class were primarily related to this issue of accessibility. The problem is not simply that cities need to make urban spaces more accessible to the poor, but that they need to make influence in the planning process more accessible. People of all socioeconomic statuses need to be included in local politics, rather than just the elite. The current system of letting the elites structure city growth in a way that benefits them is what perpetuates inequality. The voices of all community members must be heard and considered when making political decisions that affect the economy of a city. Without change to the structure of political systems within cities, socio spatial inequality will continue to grow, and the urban poor will lack access to the resources that wealthier members of the community benefit from.

Connecting the lecture from Professor Medford and chapter 2 of Undocumented Politics, the “good” minority and the “bad” minority argument seems to set the scene for whether immigrants feel appreciative or cynical towards the United States “Good” and “Bad” behavior is a very arbitrary way to describe threats to violence and deportation. Andrews states immigrants who feel appreciative towards the US as distancing themselves from their indigenous roots to feel “whiter” and take advantage of opportunities in the United States.

The questions I presented were even though many are still undocumented immigrants, why do these people feel their behavior has an influence on their fates? Does this change their view on law enforcement? On their freedom? Why?

Professor Medford’s lecture made exceptional parallels to Undocumented Politics. The “good” and “bad” minorities we discussed in class relate to the top-bottom racialization that takes places in society. An example of the “good” minority is the “wizz kids,” where Asian students excel in educational setting. In the Classic Assimilation Model we discussed, this is an example of immigrants having the ability to create new power dynamics between races.

In terms of feeling “whiter,” upward segmented assimilation explains immigrants leaning towards cultural, political, and economics consistent with whites. Over time, immigrants become similar to white Americans in terms of norms, behaviors, values, and characteristics. This equates to Andrews’ research which gives justification for immigrates having the desire to distance themselves from their indigenous roots to benefit from social and economic opportunities in the United States.

Transnational placemaking suggests individuals are able to have social ties and networks that extend across country boundaries. Having already built a repertoire in their native country, immigrants often migrate to the United States to: (1) pursuit increased economic opportunities, (2) run away from political/domestic/social issues in their native countries, and (3) better their quality of life for themselves and their families. Immigrants often challenge how communities operate, which can create a newfound global community.

Patrick Sharkey’s “Stuck in Place” brings to light the issues caused by neighborhood inequality and intergenerational disadvantage amongst poor families. He describes the ghetto as inherited, explaining that many of the same families end up living in poor neighborhoods generation after generation. Sharkey’s description of the disadvantage some people face highlights the long-term effects of the segregation and unintentionally discriminatory acts that we discussed in class. Even with the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts, which attempted to reduce residential segregation, the inequalities created by previous government policies and biases against certain races in the housing market set a cycle of disadvantage into motion that will take much longer to stop. The cumulative and multigenerational effects of living in poverty are not negated when the person moves out of poverty or when more money is given to a poor neighborhood. The problem of disadvantage is not just a physical lack of opportunity, but a deeply ingrained societal problem. 

In the disadvantaged neighborhoods Sharkey discusses, children whose parents also lived in poorer neighborhoods have lower average test scores, more anxiety, and lower educational aspirations. The impact of a highly concentrated group of people with similar values and access to resources creates a culture where people view their disadvantage as normal. Therefore, they might not attempt to improve their status by accessing more resources or working to get a better education. This ties into the class discussion on social isolation and concentration effects, explaining why children of disadvantaged parents are much more likely to be disadvantaged themselves. If nobody in a children’s family, friend group, or neighborhood went to college, the child likely did not grow up with high educational expectations or aspirations. Not only are they more likely to have lower test scores — making it harder to get into college — but they grew up in a household where going to college might not have been the standard people were striving towards.  

In response to my question about the potential solutions to this cycle of inequality, a student suggested teaching lower-class people the skills to navigate institutions such as banks and schools. I agree that local governments should introduce greater education about life skills in an attempt to create a stable, long-term integration of people from different neighborhoods. This approach would ensure that people from all economic backgrounds have the skills needed to navigate various beneficial societal institutions. As Sharkey wrote, a large factor contributing to the longevity of neighborhood disadvantage is that people lack the opportunity for success; a problem which teaching people the skills to navigate beneficial institutions would help to reduce. Although this is not the only solution to urban inequality and neighborhood disadvantage, creating more equal opportunities for all people through increased education would be a step in the right direction.   

Furthermore, increasing the accessibility of local institutions to the lower class could help to reduce some of the negative associations that people have with African-Americans from poor neighborhoods. Elijah Anderson claims that people transfer notions commonly associated with the ghetto — violence, poverty, and drugs — onto black people themselves, rather than just onto residents of certain neighborhoods. This idea of the ‘iconic ghetto’ follows black people around, regardless of where they live. Increasing people’s access to institutions and helping poorer, more disadvantaged people learn the skills needed to use the same resources as the rest of society might begin to break this concept of the iconic ghetto. If everyone is equipped with a similar set of skills to navigate different institutions, there will be less disparity of opportunity amongst socioeconomic classes. This would not stop the cycle of inequality that many people in society face today, but it would provide everyone with the same baseline set of knowledge about how to take out loans, succeed in school, and participate in governmental affairs. This small step can begin the process of helping people from all socioeconomic and neighborhood backgrounds to gain equality of opportunity. 

In “Undocumented Politics,” Abigail Andrews shows how the immigrant experience in America and its manifestations widely vary. In her book, we witnessed how immigrants from Partida and Retorno had disparate levels of political involvement, attachment to their sending town, relationships with police, and intragroup solidarity — these variables were governed by both sending and receiving conditions. Clearly, immigrants’ lives in receiving locales cannot be considered in a uniform fashion. This was emphasized by Professor Medford during her guest lecture.

Professor Medford first introduced the Classic Assimilation Model, widely utilized by the Chicago School. This model describes the “straight-line (linear) convergence” trajectory that immigrants take in their new environment. It predicts that over time, immigrants begin to internalize the norms, behaviors, beliefs, and values of their host society. Professor Medford emphasized how this process is quite extended — assimilation does not occur over several years or decades, but occurs over generations.

This model is problematic, however, as it makes major assumptions in regards to the immigrant experience. The ease of assimilation, and also the desire to assimilate, can vary between immigrant groups; according to the classic assimilation theory, there are no distinctions between groups along these lines. Take, for example, how the policing styles of Los Angeles versus North County San Diego influenced their respective  immigrants’ wishes to assimilate. For example, the conditional policing in Los Angeles rewarded “citizen-like” behavior and instilled in immigrants gratefulness and pride in America. In contrast, the arbitrary enforcement of laws in North County engendered a cynical attitude in its immigrant residents; they were skeptical of local governments, did not envision any paths to citizenship, and often did not desire to assimilate. In fact, many of them had plans to return to Mexico. This example is a clear foil to the straight-line convergence theory. 

We also recapped the segmented assimilation theory, shared by Professor Redford. This theory diversifies immigrant circumstances, including a downwards social assimilation trajectory in addition to upwards assimilation. Many immigrants, due to institutional barriers (ie: arbitrary police practices as described above, etc.), are unable to achieve assimilation, regardless of their efforts. It also acknowledges that not all immigrants seek assimilation, are pursuing the American Dream, or even want to be in America from the onset. Additionally, there are socioracial ceilings that certain immigrant demographics cannot overcome. For example, Asian-Americans, often due to their appearance and decided cultural divides from White culture, cannot assimilate into mainstream White society despite having American roots that stretch generations into the past — they are forever outsiders, according to the racial triangulation model. Also, immigrants’ status in America are tenuous as racialization can occur and brand them as outsiders — often spontaneously. We discussed how this occured in 2001 as Middle Eastern folk were labeled perpetual foreigners and threats after the September 11 attacks. Notably, but not surprisingly, this racialization is likely highly contingent on skin color — Love raised an interesting point, suggesting that European immigrants or White-passing individuals are not at risk, relative to those who are visibly of-color.

The questions I proposed during our discussion revolved around this concept of racialization. In Los Angeles, we saw how the arrival of new immigrants from Partida “racialized” older immigrants, and how an intragroup divide formed between the two demographics. Due to the city’s conditional policing, the older immigrants placed high importance on “acting White,” speaking quietly, obeying laws, and being industrious. Thus, the older immigrants deliberately distanced themselves from the new immigrants that acted “more Mexican,” were “lazy,” and could not speak English. First, I asked if it is fair to blame the new immigrants for their supposedly unattractive behavior. I empathized with those who resorted to drinking and had trouble in their new industrial/factory jobs. Secondly, I pondered if the older immigrants should be held accountable to look after the newer ones, and assist them in the assimilation process. If not, I am curious how local ally institutions can take action to allow for an easier transition to Los Angeles (ie: erecting community centers to grant male immigrants outlets for stress relief, as opposed to alcohol, etc.).

Little Village as a Community

Robert Vargas’s “Wounded City: Violent Turf Wars in Chicago Barrio” examines how a history of urban political neglect of integratory efforts of the rising minority and immigrant population produced the fractured community of Little Village. The political gerrymandering of jurisdictional boundaries of the neighborhood’s east side led to an underresourced climate with insufficient avenues for social and economic mobility available. Job opportunities were scarce, and quality of life was significantly lower in these impoverished areas when compared to the neighboring counties. The lack of inclusive efforts into the greater Chicago infrastructure, in conjunction with rising poverty rates led to the resurgence of gangs. Over time, they grew in power and established social control over the area through violence. The rise of gangs generated a cyclical battle between local, underresourced, law enforcement and the powerful gangs leading to the exacerbation of the communities’ problems. With access to the communications network that bridges residents and police, the gangs were able to emulate formal social control over the city. They established a police-like role and created pseudo-formal laws by actively punishing citizens when they violated it. Law enforcement agencies surrendered their authority by punishing citizens who called for low-impact emergencies as they believed that it was a waste of time considering the limited resources they had.

It is conflicting to see how people in Little Village are forced to act against their own community in order to maximize positive outcomes for themselves. If police are also willing to punish citizens through “street justice,” it makes you wonder if anyone is left in the area that still cares about improving the community. The state of Little Village has pushed its people towards a political indifference in regard to the interests of the community as a whole. Due to the gang’s rising threat, the residents have got no other choice left but to replace community values for the values of the criminal subculture that controls them.

Little Village reminded me of reading about rooming houses discussed in Zorbaugh’s The Gold Coast and the Slum because of how the people of Little Village disassociated themselves from their area and neighbors. Distrust plagued relationships between residents, leading to the loss of their identification with the greater community. The rapidly changing and ever demanding urban climate pushes residents into a state of anomie and normlessness. In this scenario, the residential areas are not bound together by common interest as every familial unit is forced to think for themselves in order to avoid conflict with the local gangs.

Little Village serves as a classic example of conflict theory, where, structural, top-down, oppression of the lower classes manifests in resentment and leads to violence. The creation of the gangs reveal how the community was prompted to create informal outlets for social control. The question I provided prompts the discussion of how power dynamics have changed and reshaped the values the community practices. Discussion revealed the importance of recognizing how political disenfranchising and neglect produces social conflict as well as examined how social strain was reproduced through the actions of the residents at the micro-level.

In class, we gathered that the “codes of the streets” (introduced by Elijah Anderson) is a set of informal rules governing interpersonal public behavior, including violence. There is a cultural adaptation of a fundamental mistrust in the police and judicial system that is brought by the gangs in East Little Village. The gangs in Little Village create fear within the people in the community. Gangs enforce the “code of silence”, which prevents residents from reporting a crime or cooperating with police and their investigations. People in the community end up creating spaces and contributing to gang activity. They play part in displacing their community. There is a state of powerlessness in East Little Village because of the constant distrust and threat of danger. This makes it almost impossible for East Little Village to promote and continue seeing positive change. We see this “codes of the streets” notion Elijah Anderson is conveying. Even Though residents are often contributing to the displacement and violence in their community, we see this idea of a “street-corner society” and “street families” in East Little Village. Criminal leadership shares desires for some sort of social good. There are mutual support and encouragement for an alternative lifestyle (e.g joining a gang) that appears attractive to many young people regardless of family background. Residents value sidewalks as sites of community creation and cultural production. Street corner societies are spaces of mutual support residents of East Village tend to have, due to the mistrust of the police and other agencies.

My first question asked was: “since 1997, unlike the west side, the east side has been consistently gerrymandered, thereby stunting the development of organizational infrastructure for acquiring and distributing resources to eastside blocks. Gangs fought with police to maintain drug operations and control over residents eventually creating a code of silence. What can members of the Eastside do collectively to mitigate violence in their community?” This question was prompted by the term “gerrymandering”. Gerrymandering was never declared illegal. How are politicians doing it? Is gerrymandering something that the residents of East Village need to file suit because if that’s the case, due to unlimited access to resources, the residents can not.  

My second question was prompted by the fact that people tend to look for explanations of Chicago’s violence by focusing on the residents of the neighborhoods instead of paying attention to the institutions distributing violence prevention resources throughout the city. Residents of East Little Village often rely on gangs to protect them because they don’t have equal access to the organizations, politicians, and city officials necessary to address the problem of violence.“In 2009, CPS received $260 million from President Obama’s federal stimulus legislation, of which $40 million was allocated to create one of the largest and most expensive violence reduction initiatives in the city’s history: the Culture of Calm. The Culture of Calm established a mentoring program and a crossing guard program called Street Watchers. However, nothing was done for the East. How can the government better serve the residents of East Little Village?