Despite the Cold War coming to a close, nuclear proliferation continues to be an issue of utmost importance to international security in the 21st century. While the challenges that modern states face may have changed forms, systems proposed by Schelling, Smoke, Goldstein, and others continue to be helpful today. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons loomed large, exasperating tensions between the United States and the USSR. Today, however, many of the enemies the US faces are non-state actors. While these non-state actors have yet to develop nuclear weapons, the threat of a non-state actor gaining nuclear capabilities is potentially more dangerous than previous threats. That being said, lessons from the past can continue to guide the US in its dealings relating to nuclear proliferation with unpredictable states, such as Iran and North Korea. Past scholarship focuses on two main avenues to combat nuclear proliferation: how a state should act in order to deter nuclear proliferation and how a state should act once an adversary has obtained nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons present uniquely dangerous threats for international security but can be a tool for peace if leveraged correctly. Thomas Schelling, a scholar at the forefront of international security studies, introduces the idea of the power to hurt in his book, Arms and Influence. When wielded strategically, the power to hurt can be a tool for coercion, deterrence, diplomacy. Schelling writes about the unpredictability of the use of nuclear weapons, “Nuclear weapons make it possible to do monstrous violence to the enemy without first achieving victory” (Schelling, 22). In this way, nuclear weapons represent a large shift in military tactics and provide both the opportunity for mass destruction and for peace without first winning a war. The predictability of nuclear weapons lies in their ability to inflict large-scale harm on an enemy. The speed and magnitude of nuclear weapons raise the cost of using them, an effective deterrence tool for states who possess nuclear arms. Also, declarations of guaranteed second-strikes create certainty about the consequences of a state deciding to detonate weapons. However, states’ desire for nuclear weapons goes beyond strategic deterrence. As Sagan points out, states have clear-cut motivations for developing such weapons: increase national security against foreign threats, drum up domestic political support, and align oneself in the global hierarchy with other nuclear powers (Sagan, 1). In sum, the strategic benefit for states to acquire nuclear weapons is massive. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that horizontal proliferation continues to be a current problem for international security.
Although nuclear weapons can provide stable deterrence, this is not always the case. States generally act rationally, but nuclear deterrence relies on communication between people, where miscommunication is possible. Schelling also discusses the conditions for making a credible threat, which are capability and willingness (Elias). In the realm of nuclear weapons, capability is a big step in and of itself and actors have different motivations for revealing or not revealing their nuclear arsenals. Willingness, however, is harder to communicate because of the severity of the weapon and can be misinterpreted. The US is the only country to have detonated a nuclear weapon for the sake of hurting an adversary, while other countries have attempted to demonstrate willingness through military processionals or the visible transportation of nuclear weapons (North Korea). North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is a current threat to international security, as some scholars doubt their rationality. We believe that lessons from the past about stable deterrence can still be applied to North Korea.
Nuclear Weapons on Display in North Korea, whether or not these actually are nuclear weapons, however, is disputed.
Most importantly, compelling a state to rid itself of nuclear weapons is more challenging than deterring them from gaining nuclear capabilities. Goldstein would define preemptive action as deterrence and reactive policy as compellence (Goldstein, 27). Therefore, it’s important for a state to invest effort and resources into deterring its adversaries from obtaining nuclear weapons. This avenue has already been attempted through the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and (initially) with the JCPOA with Iran, both of which are efforts to either preempt or heavily control proliferation. In this arena, as with most in international diplomacy, cooperation is essential.
Even if states do acquire nuclear weapons, as is the case with North Korea, pre-Cold War scholarship can also suggest ways forward once an adversary has developed nuclear capabilities. These tactics require vast amounts of resources, or as Smoke writes, after nuclear weapons continued to be produced, national security strategy began to “involve never-ending expenditures and hazards” (Smoke, 61). While issues surrounding nuclear proliferation were at the forefront of national security priorities during the Cold War, some of these discussions have faded as issues such as terrorism, emerging global superpowers, and insurgencies dominate discussions. Some scholars such as Nagl argue that the US Army should reallocate its resources to focus specifically on 4GW and dedicate resources to fighting insurgent groups, developing counterinsurgency tactics, and some nuclear deterrence. Gentile also argues that the Army should focus on making itself versatile. Given that nuclear proliferation continues to be a problem for international security, it is worth investing some resources into learning from Cold War scholarship and attempting to deter Iran and North Korea from developing or implementing nuclear arms.
Once a state has developed nuclear capabilities, there are three main reactionary strategies: all-out war, counterforce strikes, or developing international norms for the use and maintenance of nuclear weapons. Walzer writes about the just war theory, which involves three components: jus ad bellum or conditions that are acceptable to go to war, jus in bello or how a state should conduct itself in war, and jus post bellum or the best way to leave war. Schelling also writes about the idea of brinkmanship or “a competition in risk-taking” (Schelling, 91). When nuclear weapons are involved as a potential response to conventional war tactics (or as a second-strike measure), these equations become much more fraught. Risk-taking and going to war over the development of weapons is not just about whether to up the ante with more air strikes but about whether such an action will be a final straw for the adversary and lead to nuclear war. Counterforce strikes target military holdings, such as nuclear arsenals and are an appealing avenue for reacting to nuclear proliferation because they are targeted at what is distinctly not civilian. However, one major concern that accompanies the discussions of counterforce is that counterforce strikes weaken deterrence because they compromise an adversary’s second-strike capability (Lieber and Press). The final general category is to develop global standards for nuclear weapons. This has proven successful when dealing with rational state actors because the threat of nuclear war is so unappealing to both sides. There are issues in this arena, however, when non-state actors and irrational state actors are involved.