One could argue that following the Cold War era, the United States Army still has not been able to completely adapt its counterinsurgency tactics for fighting today’s unconventional warfare. Lessons from failed counterinsurgencies in conflicts during the Cold War have come to fruition today, but have been slowly implemented for the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This caused the United States to get into the cycle of unsuccessful consistent conflict in foreign lands. John Nagl quotes Major Niel Smith in his thoughts about the wars: “It is embarrassing that it took us over three years to develop a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency in the field when many of the ‘lessons’ were found on the bookshelves of the post library”(Nagl 23). Nagl highlights how American soldiers were still unable to adapt to unconventional, non-linear warfare following the Cold War because they “had no doctrinal or training background in irregular warfare and reacted in an ad hoc fashion to challenges”(Nagl 22). Without the counterinsurgency training necessary for unconventional warfare, one could contend that the United States and other major military powers could not learn from history to change their counterinsurgency tactics in new unconventional wars.
Furthermore, this counter-argument insists that the United States had still not prepared its Army with the crucial goals of counterinsurgency following the Cold War lessons. The most important strategies for counterinsurgencies today include “the need to secure the population, subordinate military measures to political ends, use minimum force, and work through the host nation,” but they “are not new” (Nagl 23). The elements of Fourth Generation Warfare were already at the forefront of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. One could argue that major military powers like the United States failed to adjust military counterinsurgency capabilities at the start of these wars. Although, Nagl and other advocates of winning the present wars suggest that major military powers like the United States are continuing to adjust counterinsurgency tactics to avoid large-scale conventional combat. He claims that “for the security of the nation and all its interests, the U.S. needs the army to continue to learn and adapt to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare and institutionalize these adaptations so they are not forgotten again” (Nagl 21). Therefore, even though there is an argument that the United States was unprepared for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Fourth Generation Warfare still influenced the international security community to change counterinsurgency tactics following the Cold War.
We argue a few lessons the United States can take away from wars before the Cold War, as war has evolved and new forms of unconventional warfare must be considered to win current and future wars. While this claim is supported by the many arguments we have presented, it is important to consider the poor success level of the United States making efforts to fight with unconventional warfare tactics and consider the implications for future fighting tactics. A great example of the United States using unconventional warfare techniques unsuccessfully is our napalm use in the Vietnam War. As previously discussed, Fourth Generation Warfare’s major goal is to destroy the will of the enemy using political, economic, social, and military means (Hammes 2). The United States decided to counter the Vietnamese low- technology yet brutal Guerilla Warfare tactics with napalm, a highly technologically advanced brutal weapon (Elias, “Insurgents”). Napalm is a technology that sets objects in even wet climates on fire. The Americans used this technology to set Vietnamese villages on fire, as soldiers would strike then hide among the villagers, and the Americans were trying to fight against this (Elias, “Insurgents”). This was seen as an effective strategy to use in a Fourth Generation Warfare climate where it seemed there were no rules. However, the American soldiers quickly lost domestic support when pictures of innocent civilians fleeing from their burning homes surfaced.
Scholar Walzer argues that fighting morally is the right and strategic thing to do even in Fourth Generation Warfare. Walzer argues that the Vietnam War was not about land and resources, but about ‘hearts and minds,’ and because of this, “justice turns out to be a key to victory” (Walzer 930). Therefore, in the Fourth Generation war where military defeat is not the sole desire, but political, psychological, and social defeat are also the goal, losing the ‘hearts and minds’ of civilians and policy makers both domestically and internationally will lead to defeat. Walzer also argues that in current times and recent history, “…the media are omnipresent, and the whole world is watching” (Walzer 932). Technological gains have not only increased the weapon’s destruction power but have also increased the reach of a powerful photograph. Therefore, it is a liability to fight like the United States fought in the Vietnam War, and the use of such brutal Fourth Generation Warfare tactics is not viable for a democratic state such as America to successfully win. Current Fourth Generation wars are a battle of willpower, and a major component of succeeding is outlasting the opponent. If such brutal tactics are used in current wars such as our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, important domestic civilians and political support could be lost, leading to our defeat. Therefore, it is important to consider new forms of unconventional warfare techniques in fighting current or future battles. However, there are additional considerations such as winning over the ‘hearts and minds’ domestically, internationally, and politically that must be taken under consideration for the United States to stand a chance of winning current and future wars.