Lieber, Kier, and Press ask fundamental questions regarding security and nuclear weapons, which directly relate to warfare’s new evolution. They specifically look at nuclear weapons’ issues, arguing that the world is more technological than ever before. Additionally, they look at how countries are using new technologies to improve current weapons. The authors question whether improving such a deadly weapon is beneficial to national security. The authors argue that “…Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instruments of deterrence: no conceivable benefit of attacking a nuclear-armed state could be worth the cost of getting hit with nuclear weapons in retaliation”, explaining the idea that nuclear weapons work well for deterrence as no country wants to strike first in fear of nuclear annihilation (Lieber, Kier, and Press 13). The authors argue that “As long as nuclear arsenals are survivable, that is, able to withstand an enemy’s like and retaliate, nuclear weapons are a tremendous force for peace” (Lieber, Kier, and Press 13). Therefore, the only way in which nuclear weapons could disrupt peace is if the state finds a way to survive a nuclear attack.
Additionally, issues of safety are important to consider when it comes to nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are more accurate than conventional weapons, as states have aerial images of their exact target, programming where the nuclear weapon should hit (Lieber, Kier, and Press). This issue leads to the security dilemma, whether increasing weapon power can benefit international security. Furthermore, there is also significant room for error with nuclear weapons resulting in unwanted mass casualties (Lieber, Kier, and Press 28). Nuclear weapons are entirely technological and can experience cyber hacks and miscalculations. Therefore, nuclear weapon proliferation control is essential when dealing with nuclear countries. The ability to control brings a stronger sense of peace, limiting what states can do and can not do with nuclear weapons.
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Carol Cohn illustrates that counterforce strikes are essential for maintaining credibility over enemies in nuclear weapon proliferation control. Counterforce strikes targets military enemies and nuclear facilities to limit second strike capabilities. Cohn explains that in using counterforce, “perhaps it is possible to spend one’s time thinking about scenarios for the use of destructive technology and to have human bodies remain invisible in that technological world precisely because that world itself now includes the domestic, the human, the warm, and play- ful-the Christmas trees, the RVs, the affectionate”(Cohn 699). With the rise in technology and the return of Guerilla Warfare following the Cold War, military diplomats have the challenge of separating nuclear control facilities from civilian populations. However, “the imagery that domesticates, that humanizes insentient weapons, may also serve, paradoxically, to make it all right to ignore sentient human bodies, human lives”(Cohn 699). Counterforce strikes are beneficial in modern unconventional warfare, but still include “death and loss”(Cohn 699). Civilians are vulnerable to miscalculations and accidents in domestic lands. Cohn adds, “weapons, not humans, that get `killed’.`Fratricide’ occurs when one of your warheads ‘kills’ another of your own warheads. There is much discussion of vulnerability and survivability, but it is about the vulnerability and survival of weapons systems, not people”(Cohn 699). Without an emphasis on the survivability of people in attacking the enemy, “human death simply is ‘collateral damage’ – collateral to the real subject, which is weapons themselves”(Cohn 711). Cohn suggests that civilian casualties are still an issue in the unconventional conflict, but the future of international security between states will continue to see counterforce strikes as a way to control nuclear weapon proliferation.
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Thomas Hammes looks at the different generations of warfare as an essential perspective when discussing how war has changed over time. The first three generations are conventional warfare, while the Fourth Generation is unconventional. First Generation Warfare grew from the invention of gunpowder, taking roots in Europe where their political, economic, and social structures grew from a feudal system to one of nation-states with monarchs ruling (Hammes 16-17). We can see the implementation of First Generation Warfare in the Napoleonic War. Hammes argues that Second Generation Warfare focuses more on a defense strategy rather than an offensive one. Second Generation Warfare had machine guns, magazine-fed rifles, barbed wire, and rapid fire artillery (Hammes 20). Due to advanced weaponry, it “took away freedom of movement and forced both sides to rely on firepower” (Hammes 20). World War I is a prime example of the use of Second Generation Warfare.
Third and Fourth Generation Warfare changed the battlefield forever, emphasizing the importance of psychological tactics. Third Generation Warfare required political, economic, social, and technological conditions (Hammes 25). This change meant the adversary focused on destroying the enemy from within by targeting the enemy’s leadership instead of soldiers. A great example of the use of Third Generation Warfare is in World War II. Lastly, Fourth Generation Warfare created an even greater shift in warfare strategies. Not only are non-state actors introduced, but the number of casualties decreases as war now relies heavily on technology, which can more accurately destroy. “Fourth Generation Warfare uses all available networks – political, economic, social, and military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit” (Hammes 2). Unlike other generations, the Fourth Generation takes longer as insurgent groups try to wear down their enemies for as long as possible until they are forced to give up. The goal is to destroy the political will of the enemies’ decision maker (Hammes 2). Wars in which Fourth Generation Warfare were used describe the only wars the United States has ever lost: taking place in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia (Hammes 3).
Additionally, there were many societal changes during Fourth Generation Warfare that Hammes discusses. Since drones and other technological advances are relatively cheaper than physical armies and weapons, there was an exponential increase in the number of global players (Hammes 33). There was also an increase of international organizations like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization because the world runs on anarchy. Therefore, states tried to create organizations that could assist in keeping everyone accountable for their actions. One of the biggest societal changes was introducing non-state actors’ influence on the international scene (Hammes 35). Not all stateless actors are terrorist groups like al-Qaeda; some groups include the Greenpeace movement.
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John Nagl is another author who discusses Fourth Generation Warfare. Nagl discusses how the United States in the early 2000s developed a counterinsurgency protocol in Afghanistan and focused on learning from the mistakes they made in the past. More specifically, the errors made in Vietnam concerning Fourth Generation Warfare. For the United States to advance both its security and its interests, they need “the army to continue to learn and adapt to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare and institutionalize these adaptations so they are not forgotten” (Nagl 21). The United States must develop new strategies, as conventional fighting methods will no longer lead to victory in current and future wars. Adapting to these new tactics is especially important when technological warfare is cost-effective and has insurgent-like asymmetric strategies (Nagl 26).
Additionally, according to Nagl, the United States needs to focus on current wars, as the United States currently has its nation’s interest at stake with soldiers in harm’s way. Nagl states, “(…) the Army must devote the last full measure of its devotion to winning the wars it is in. Future conflicts are important, but the present conflicts are critical”, furthering the idea that America needs to prepare for the future while simultaneously ending their current wars (Nagl 21). Additionally, Nagl argues that the United States Army is “out of balance” because of a “focus on training for counterinsurgency operations to the exclusion of other capabilities” (Nagl 21). The Army’s unpreparedness is prevalent, especially with its failure to quickly adapt to counterinsurgency groups’ demands in Iran and Afghanistan (Nagl 22). Therefore, to end the current wars and win future ones, the United States must adapt to the new generation of warfare.
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Lastly, Samuel Griffith discusses the rise of Guerilla Warfare and Mao’s guerilla tactic theories. These tactics and strategies are used by terrorists, hoping to attack bigger, and more powerful military units like the United States. These groups use their small military units to their advantage by being easily mobile and striking when the U.S. least expects it. They use the terrain and bad weather to mobilize even though it is perilous and hard while also focusing on distraction methods. Scholar Mao believed that Guerilla Warfare went through a merging of phases (Griffith 20). The first phase is the organization, consolidation, and preservation of local areas situated in isolated and challenging terrain (Griffith 20). This remoteness helps to keep groups mobile and hidden from the enemy. It also helps small groups of two or three to infiltrate the local communities and persuade/convince them to support the group (Griffith 20).
The second phase looks at Guerrilla Warfare as a progressive approach that increases attacks (Elias, “Wars Without End”). This phase attacks the opponent’s weaker and more vulnerable military groups. “The primary purpose of these operations is to procure arms, ammunition, and other essential material, particularly medical supplies and radios” (Griffith 21). This purpose allows for the group to progressively expand their operations and collect weapons. The third phase is about destroying the enemy, drawing out negotiations, engaging in conventional battle, and if this does not work, retreat to phase one and two (Elias, “Wars Without End”). This phase’s goal is to exhaust the opposition with attempts at an amicable agreement. As Griffith argues “Negotiation, then, is undertaken for the dual purpose of gaining time to buttress a position (military, political, social, economic) and to wear down, frustrate, and harass the opponent” (22). This argument reiterates the Fourth Generation Warfare’s timeline, one that is exponentially longer than that of a conventional war. Therefore, Mao believes that intelligence is a decisive factor in insurgent warfare and counterinsurgency warfare.
Guerilla leaders expect all members, women, children, young or old, to act as agents who must have the intelligence to provide conceivable information (Griffith 22-23). These groups have increased knowledge of the terrain and fight under their conditions. Griffith argues that “Guerrillas fight only when the chances of victory are weighted heavily in their favor; if the tide of battle unexpectedly flows against them, they withdraw” (23). They rely heavily on creative leadership, spontaneity, distraction, and mobility to create a good chance of winning before the battle. Some make plans with the primary goal to harass others and to dislocate the enemy’s plans completely. This change confuses the commanders and sets their plans back (Griffith 23). This strategy prolongs the warfare and tests the opponent’s willpower to keep fighting. Some setbacks might even convince the opponent to quit. The Guerrilla’s goal is to be flexible, striking when and where the enemy least expects it (Griffith 24). The development of psychological warfare is a direct result of the evolution into Fourth Generation Warfare.