The Cold War, nuclear deterrence, and the indirect use of force

Thomas Schelling distinguishes between compellent and deterrent threats and how they are utilized as instruments of power to achieve political goals. Deterrent threats are passive and involve an actor vowing to use force should an adversary pursue a certain policy (Schelling, 1966, 71). Meanwhile, compellent threats involve initiating an action or threatening action that will be sustained until an adversary performs the desired action (Schelling, 1966, 73). As Schelling notes, deterrent threats are simpler and easier to communicate to an adversary than compellent threats. Deterrent threats are often communicated through necessary preparations for sustaining the status-quo and are, in turn, confirmed and demonstrated over time through an actor’s response to their adversary’s inaction (Schelling, 1966, 74). The assurances and credibility of compellent threats, as well as the consequences for non-compliance, are harder to demonstrate in advance and tend to be reactionary and less passive (Schelling, 1966, 78).

Avery Goldstein’s typology describes how military force is used, the goals such force seeks to achieve, and the military means and strategies used to achieve these goals (Goldstein, 2000, 26). Goldstein argues that force can be utilized primarily in two ways: directly or indirectly. States utilize the direct use of force when they seek to achieve military objectives, for example by destroying a physical target that disadvantages their adversary (Goldstein, 2000, 26).  When states hold their military force in reserve to change the psychological calculations of their adversary, they are employing in the indirect use of force (Goldstein, 2000, 27). In this sense, a strategy utilizing the indirect use of force is successful when the major military action or threat remains unused (Goldstein, 2000, 29). Regarding military objectives, the indirect use of force is used to either maintain the status quo through deterrence or change the status quo through compellence.

For example, nuclear weapons are used as deterrent threats to maintain the status quo and are most successful when they are not used for solely physical destruction (Goldstein, 2000, 28). In contrast, states may use conventional military force to change the status quo by relying on threats to inflict unacceptable punishment if their adversary does not swiftly comply (Goldstein, 2000, 31).

Richard Smoke delineates the intricacies of the Cold War and the beginning of great powers amassing military capabilities in times of peace. These two topics have important considerations for understanding contemporary nuclear deterrence and international security strategies. In the aftermath of World War II, Soviet aggression and heightened influence triggered the U.S. to pass the National Security Act of 1947 which established the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. Smoke says that this represents the first period of large, continuous military expenditures in times of peace in order to ensure national and international security (Smoke, 1991, 45). Additionally, the U.S. had to provide economic and military assistance to Western Europe in order to deter possible Soviet invasions which was previously supplied by America’s status as the sole nuclear power (Smoke, 1991, 58). After the Soviet’s successful atomic test, America knew it would soon be faced with a nuclear counterpart that could ensure mutually assured destruction (Smoke, 1991, 58). Any American or Allied attack on Soviet cities could trigger a nuclear strike which changed traditional military and international security strategies.

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4GW & Trends Since the Cold War

Thomas Hammes offers an overview of the generations of warfare, emphasizing how “each succeeding generation reached deeper into the enemy’s territory in an effort to defeat him” (2006, 31). Currently, the fourth-generation warfare (4GW) climate has meant that traditional military capabilities are less effective. Rather, the ability to “[attack] the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will” is of increased importance (2006, 2). The ability to persuade, then, relies on the indirect use of force to coerce adversaries and achieve political and military objectives. Hammes credits Mao with outlining the fundamentals of 4GW and insurgent strategy during the Chinese Civil War. Mao emphasized civilian support, as they would provide an “intelligence network, a constant source of manpower, and resources in the form of food and labor” (47). Mao’s three phases of an insurgency emphasize the slow and categorized consolidation of power, wherein flexibility between phases is required when battling a more advantaged conventional power (54). While 4GW emerged during the Cold War, and whose elements of insurgency were present prior to the Cold War, the emergence of increased non-state actors, state actors, and the “growth of international organizations” like the UN and World Bank, complicates war and thus, de-incentivizes our resort to military conflict (33). Since “all sectors of society are becoming networked on an international scale” the increased actors during international conflict guarantees that countries enter into military conflicts with adversaries who already have access to your internal networks in some capacities (42).

Andrew Mack outlines the difficulties modern armies face when engaged in ‘small wars’.  The Vietnam War further helps us understand how insurgencies are fundamental ways of fighting in 4GW. The rising success of insurgencies are a result of the increased involvement of civilians in international warfare. 4GW is defined by asymmetric warfare, where “the war is ‘total’” for one side, “while for the external power it is necessarily ‘limited’” (181). Not only were the insurgents less likely to give up, but they garnered more public support out of an “asymmetry in resource power,” which created a “common hostility felt towards the external enemy” (182). Asymmetric warfare also negatively impacts support for military intervention in the population of the foreign state: “A war with no visible payoff against an opponent who poses no direct threat will come under increasing criticism as battle casualties rise and economic costs escalate” (185).

The involvement of the domestic public in supporting the foreign intervention, while the foreign public limits their ability to mobilize, echoes the trend in warfare where the “polity and social institutions” are “ultimately more decisive” in a side’s victory (177).

John Nagl argues that conventional military intervention, such as the use of “field artillery” is less important in warfare today (2009, 20). Instead, the army should continue to “learn and adapt to counterinsurgency… warfare” (21). Adapting recognizes that fourth-generation warfare requires a very flexible strategy as we transition into a form of warfare that is constantly changing: “state and nonstate enemies will seek more asymmetric ways to challenge the United States” (25). The need to adapt also arises out of the “doctrinal and organizational rigidity” of our own military, which has “failed to begin institutionalizing counterinsurgency learning until… 2006” (22-23). Therefore, while the United States has been more successful in conventional strategies even after the Cold War, today those strategies are no longer sufficient.

Polyakova and Boyer argue that although technology is not solely responsible for bringing about 4GW, it has since yielded cheaper and more efficient ways to infiltrate an adversary’s society. More specifically, “cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns” typically target the public sphere in order to stir disorder in democratic societies (2018, 1). The anonymity that cyber-attacks allow, also leaves less accountability for “unintended consequences and ambiguous results” which further accentuates the increased need for adaptability in 4GW (2). Lastly, while cyber-attacks are still a concern, the introduction of information war further echoes the increased public participation in war, as it recognizes that public unrest will make military decisions more difficult for leaders.

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Terrorism

The strategic model asserts that terrorism can be defined as violence or the threat of violence “directed in pursuit of… a political aim” (Hoffman, 2015, 15). According to this logic, terrorists are rational actors who use the indirect use of force expressly to achieve “consistent political goals” that are formally adopted as part of their organization’s platform (Abrahms, 2008, 80). A more thorough analysis, however, reveals the strategic model’s contradictions, including its coercive ineffectiveness, the reality that “terrorist attacks on civilians have historically empowered hard-liners” who effectively become committed to blocking terrorists from achieving their political goals (Abrahms, 2008, 83). Evidently the ultimate aim of terrorists is not to achieve prescribed political goals. In other words, the strategic model is flawed.

Instead, a consideration of empirical evidence and the natural systems model of organization theory reveals that “people participate in terrorist organizations… to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists” (Abrahms, 2008, 103). While the prevailing assumption by policymakers and scholars has been that terrorists and would-be terrorists are uneducated and impoverished, in reality the overwhelming majority of Salafi terrorists have received some post-secondary education and are from middle or upper class families (Sageman, 2013, 521).

That terrorists recruits are often lonely and seek social solidarity— as opposed to being uneducated and impoverished— has profound implications for international security and states’ efforts to curb terrorist recruitment. Since rank and file members of terrorist organizations seek affective community ties (unlike their leaders who may well have political motivations in line with the strategic model), states should pursue policies that “reduce the demand for at-risk populations to turn to terrorist organizations in the first place” (Abrahms, 2008, 105). In the case of Salafi terrorism, rather than democracy promotion or erroneously relying on education, this would involve countering “Muslims’ sense of alienation from democratic societies” by fostering inclusivity and encouraging moderate civil society organizations (Abrahms, 2008, 105). Such policies would provide at-risk populations with the community and sense of belonging that they otherwise seek by joining terrorist organizations.

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Power in international security

Joseph Nye provides a contemporary analysis of power in the international arena. Nye consolidates modern power into three types. First, hard power is a function of coercion and uses top-down force to attain political ends. Second, soft power is a function of influence and attraction that persuades other international actors to act a certain way.

Lastly, Nye coins the term smart power to describe the combination of both soft and hard power (Nye, 2011, xv). In an increasingly globalized world, Nye argues that power must be thought in terms of the ability to accomplish goals that involves power with other international actors rather than power over others (Nye, 2011, xvii). This change is also due in part to an increasingly crowded international arena with non-state actors and the polarized divide between western powers and eastern powers. Nye argues that the U.S., though rich in economic resources and hard power, has a problem with power conversion or the ability to translate resources into effective influence and soft power (Nye, 2011, 198). The U.S. has continually relied on conventional military force and hard power (i.e., the Defense Department) rather than diplomacy and soft power (i.e., the State Department) to accomplish its political and national security objectives (Nye, 2011, 153). Nye’s assessment entails several considerations for contemporary international security, mainly how the U.S. must improve the conventional tactics it used to confront the Soviet Union during the Cold War to address the current rise of China.

G. Ikenberry adjusts the realist perspective on the global power competition between the U.S. and China arguing that the international order China confronts is substantially different that those previously confronted by emerging powers like the Soviet Union (Ikenberry, 2008, 24). Since multiple states have nuclear striking capabilities, conventional military conflicts amongst great powers have become increasingly unlikely forcing international actors to exert influence and power through novel pathways. Ikeneberry argues that the United Sates’ “unipolar moment’ as the sole superpower will inevitably end but this event does not ensure that China will be its replacement (Ikenberry, 2008, 25). Rather, Ikenberry argues that China is in competition with the Western order and its liberal-democratic institutions that are extremely durable and able to accommodate rising powers (Ikenberry, 2008, 31). Furthermore, due to the importance of western institutions like the World Trade Organization, Ikenberry argues that China’s path to becoming a global power runs through the Western order which the United States could use to its advantage if it rejects isolationism, traditional assumptions of global power struggles and enforces the existing frameworks (Ikenberry, 2008, 32). Ikenberry’s assessment of U.S. China relations is especially valuable in light of the incoming Biden administration who, he argues, must renew its support for multilateral institutions and strengthen its ties with western allies.