Although lessons from historic international security dilemmas can be used for modern situations, evolving methods of direct and indirect force render pre-Cold War methods archaic. How can the U.S. and its allies abroad use historical lessons when dealing with international security when weapons, strategies, and information flow have changed so dramatically? The new stage for international security is no longer in plain view. It is obscured behind digital, cyber, and information warfare. The ways in which the U.S. might attack these ambiguous targets is through the use of drones and precision-guided weapons. Cyber, Drone and Information warfare are drastically different means of achieving international security, so lessons learned in previous conflicts cannot be relevant in this era of advanced technology and strategy. 

Cyber warfare is one weapon, or strategy, that distinguishes the present battlefield from the pre-Cold War battlefield. In their work on cyber warfare, W.P. Singer and Allen Friedman focus on how complex the application and subsequent defense of cyber warfare is. They write, “part of why cyberspace is so difficult to define lies not only in its expansive, global nature, but also in the fact that the cyberspace of today is almost unrecognizable compared to its humble beginnings” (Singer and Friedman 2014,13). As countries pour vast resources into acquiring and developing ever-faster internet connections, the world becomes interconnected. Governments and the private sector use cyber means to streamline their operations and businesses which leads to greater efficiency, but also greater dependence on stable and secure connections. The authors note the extent to which our daily lives depend on cyber controls when they write, “the firms behind it use cyberspace to, among other things, balance the levels of chlorination in your city’s water, control the flow of gas that heats your home, and execute the financial transactions that keep currency prices stable” (Singer and Friedman 2014, 15). While interconnectedness is beneficial for business and personal communication, it presents a profound security threat. As Singer and Friedman write, “the takeaway for cybersecurity is that the entire system is based on trust. It is a system that works efficiently, but it can be broken, either by accident or by maliciously feeding the system bad data” (Singer and Friedman 2014, 25). Singer and Friedman have thus established how dependent state and non-state actors are on cyber elements that transcend boundaries and security networks. The potency of cyber warfare, and its exploitation of this dependence, was most stark during the use of the Stuxnet worm. Stuxnet was a cyber worm that caused centrifuges in Iran, used to enrich weapons-grade Uranium, to spin out of control while making the control room operators think all was normal (Broad et al. 2011). In this  moment, the devastating effects of cyber weapons were confirmed. It illuminated just how dependent nations were on computer and cyber-based components to perform important security functions. On this notion of dependence, Broad writes, “years before the worm hit Iran, Washington had become deeply worried about the vulnerability of the millions of computers that run everything in the United States from bank transactions to the power grid” (Broad et al. 2011). Unlike conventional weapons, it is difficult for cyber weapons to be used according to established security strategies. Whereas nuclear and conventional weapons can be used to compel or deter an enemy, cyber war is significantly more ambiguous which means that it lacks the clear messaging required to compel or deter. With conventional weapons, enemy entities know who is attacking them, which is not necessarily the case with cyber weapons. As such, cyber weapons do not conform to the security principles of yore but require different strategic thinking and implementation. 

(Hruska, 2015)

Precision weapons and drones also indicate a need for new underlying security principles that have evolved from pre-Cold War theories and strategies. Older models of security rely on conventional means of warfare such as boots on the ground or more conventional air strikes. Today, the U.S. deploys technology that is vastly different from technology used even during recent land wars like the Gulf War and the beginning of the Iraq war. It used to be the case that if the U.S. government wanted to push-back an insurgency, rebel group, or even foreign government, it had to use ground troops or conventional bombs that often-produced civilian casualties as a byproduct. Daniel Byman argues for the efficacy of drones saying, “and compared with a 500 pound bomb dropped from an F-16, the grenadelike warheads carried by most drones create smaller, more precise blast zones that decrease the risk of unexpected structural damage and casualties” (Byman 2017, 433). Moving away from large civilian casualty events, especially in an age of heightened media, is a rising priority in international security. Additionally, as the style of war has changed over the decades to more non-state unconventional combat scenarios, the advanced weapons technology is protecting U.S. troops, a vital security interest. Byman writes, “finally, using drones is also far less bloody than asking allies to hunt down terrorists on the United States’ behalf” (Byman 2017, 433). Using advanced weaponry, such as drones, to firm up relations with allies abroad is a strategic security measure. The more the U.S. and other nations replace conventional soldiers with precision weapons, the stronger the U.S. position in foreign conflict is. If the U.S. does not have to face the difficult decision of whether to deploy ground troops or not, which is usually unpopular domestically, it is stronger and less susceptible to enemies leveraging domestic opinion to gain strategic advantage. Jeffrey Stern describes how precise these weapons have become, writing, “this last category includes 11,320 Paveways: a type of laser-guided bomb that can be dropped from nine miles away and 40,000 feet up and that will, more often than not, strike within 10 feet of its target” (Stern 2018, 9). Weapons that were this advanced did not exist pre-Cold War. In the same way that WWII had to be fought differently from the American revolution, advanced weapons have made it so that the U.S. cannot rely on pre-Cold War security principles as lessons for how to engage enemies today. 

Finally, information warfare targets points of weakness that stem from cultural differences within the U.S. It inserts itself, using technology and willingness, into the most severe cracks in the American social fabric. It then rips the seams while sewing insurrection in its wake. To complicate matters even more, it is relatively cheap and easy to deploy. David Lazer describeswrites on the use of fake news to influence a population, writing, “Facebook estimated that as many as 60 million bots may be infesting its platform. They were responsible for a substantial portion of political content posted during the 2016 U.S. campaign, and some of the same bots were later used to attempt to influence the 2017 French election” (Lazer et al. 2018, 1095). Factional conflict and political instability negatively affect both national and international security. The use of the internet to undermine enemy nations is a 21st century tactic. Underlying security principles from the 1970s and earlier do not account for technology that accesses and manipulates the minds of millions of citizens. Alina Polyakova notes, “in nonconventional warfare, however, the consequences and implications of an offensive action are ambiguous to both sides. The Obama administration, for example, did not have a clearly defined response strategy to Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election” (Polyakova and Boyer 2018, 17). She goes on to argue that the weak U.S. response signaled impotence to China, Iran and North Korea as they work to “undermine Western societies” (Polyakova and Boyer 2018, 17). Information warfare has devastating consequences on international security because of its ambiguity, low-cost, and ease of deployment. It has the ability to undermine established political systems as well as factionalize citizens. This technology did not exist in the pre-Cold War era. Nations cannot rely on previous experience, or lessons learned, because there simply was nothing like the technology or advanced weaponry of today in the pre-Cold War period.

(Owen 2019)

Advances in weapons technology and methods of attack render old security principles useless. The underlying strategies from decades of conventional war experience do not apply to modern tactics and techniques because they existed in a wholly different environment. Because of the modernization of both the U.S. military and the U.S. private tech sector, new security theories must be developed to harness and cope with the new combat and political environments.