The international security issues in the post-cold war world are fundamentally different from those confronted during the Cold War. For example, the technology available to state and non-state actors has progressed dramatically and conflicts have evolved into fourth-generation warfare. However, there are still valuable lessons that can be learned from the past. In fact, learning from past mistakes and experiences is essential for success in future conflicts. As discussed by Griffith in Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare, the reason why guerrillas can successfully defeat adversaries that are much more powerful is because they take the time to gather intelligence about their opponents, and learn from past experiences to improve in the future.¹ Additionally, John Nagl in “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” argues that the reason the United States has not been successful in conflicts since the end of the Vietnam War is because they did not “[institutionalize] the lessons” from the past.² In fact, he argues that “the most frustrating aspects of these problems [facing the U.S. military today] is that they represent a failure to learn from history.”³ 

Feeling embarrassed by their defeat in Vietnam, the United States Army decided to “bury” their “counterinsurgency doctrine” altogether, “rather than rethinking and improving” their strategies to be more preparedfor future conflict.⁴ If the United States refuses to learn from and study history, when engaging in conflicts with weaker actors such as insurgents or guerrilla forces that rely on intelligence and intentionality, the U.S. will not be in a position to succeed. As a result, it is imperative that the United States adapt this lesson from the Cold War in order to protect international security today. 

With the evolution from Third Generation Warfare (3GW) to Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) occurring during the Cold War period, there are lessons from the past that are necessary to understand when fighting today’s 4GW conflicts in “Iraq, Afghanistan…worldwide against terror,” and when preparing for future international security challenges.⁵ Hammes notes that Fourth Generation War, “like all wars…seeks to change the enemy’s political position…[using] available weapons systems to achieve that end. Like all wars, it reflects the society it is part of…[and] has evolved in consonance with society as a whole. It evolves because practical people solved specific problems related to their fights against powerful enemies.”⁶ More significantly, 4GW is the only generation that has been used to defeat “superpowers” like the U.S. and USSR.⁷ Therefore, it is necessary for the United States and other global powers to study the “logical progression” from 3GW and 4GW to be better equipped for wars of the future.⁸ Weaker actors will undoubtedly use this warfare against this country in the future, so the U.S. military must take time to prepare now. 

Additionally, even though the conflicts and type of warfare we see today are different from what we saw during the Cold War, actors are still making rational decisions driven by the fundamental concepts of deterrence and compellence, and the indirect and direct use of force. Therefore, we can learn from Cold War decisions using these concepts to apply them to conflicts today. They are still relevant strategies, and only the ways they are used have changed. Actors no longer have to rely on a boots-on-the-ground approach to conventional warfare because technology has allowed other strategies to rise to prominence. With the invention of drones, cyber-warfare, and disinformation campaigns, it is possible to threaten or inflict damage on someone or something from across the world just by pushing a button. As Professor Elias argued in class on November 3rd, “what can be seen can be hit.”⁹ Therefore, technology changes the speed at which actors must respond to threats, but it does not change the rational calculation behind the action. 

The capabilities of nuclear weapons are still a serious threat to be used in conflict among nations at war as they were during the Cold War era. State actors with such capabilities must tread lightly in situations where nuclear weapons can be utilized by both sides as a means to deter or compel their adversary to act.

The Vietnam War demonstrated the lesson that fighting a “just” war is a necessary strategic asset to garner support domestically as well as abroad. As Michael Walzer in his article “The Triumph of just War Theory” asserts, “we should not fight wars about whose justice we are doubtful, and that once we are engaged, we have to fight justly so as not to antagonize the civilian population, whose political support is necessary to a military victory.”¹⁰ When the government and military of the United States lost American and Vietnamese public support for the war, achieving victory became nearly impossible for the United States because of the increased political costs of continuing the war for government officials, a breakdown of morale for soldiers risking their lives to carry on the war that their country’s people do not accept and the unwillingness of the Vietnamese to accept the United States’ actions or to support them. In drawing from this lesson, if the United States hopes to reach any type of victory in the conflicts, they engage in this post-Cold War Era, proper justification is a necessary prerequisite. 

1. Griffith, Samuel B. Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare, (Praeger, 1961),“Strategy, Tactics and Logistics in Revolutionary War,” 20-26.
2. Nagl, John A. “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, No. 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 23.
3.  Nagl. “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In.” 23.
4. Nagl. “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In.” 23.
5. Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone, (Zenith Press, 2006), p 15.
6. Hammes. The Sling and the Stone. 3.
7. Hammes. The Sling and the Stone. 14.
8. Hammes. The Sling and the Stone. 31.
9. Elias, Barbara. “International Security Class – Fall 2020 : 11/03/2020.” International Security. November 3, 2020. Lecture.
10.  Walzer, Michael. “The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success),” Social Research 69:4 (Winter 2002): 931.

Image Sources:

1.  Serle, “Suspected Drone Strikes Kill 12 Civilians in Yemen,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, May 15, 2012, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-05-15/suspected-drone-strikes-kill-12-civilians-in-yemen.
2. The Economist, “A Deal to End the Insurgency in Afghanistan Would Be Wonderful,” The Economist, February 2, 2019, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/02/02/a-deal-to-end-the-insurgency-in-afghanistan-would-be-wonderful.
3. “U.S. Soldiers Shake Hands with Afghan Children While Patrolling through a Village near Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, March 24, 2015.,” U.S. Dept of Defense, accessed December 19, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/observe/photo-gallery/igphoto/2001138902/.