Nuclear deterrence and compellence during and after the Cold War

Thomas Schelling argues that while methods of war during and after the Cold War are fundamentally different as a result of their different tools, the principles of deterrence and compellence still underlie all conflict and operate in the same ways now as they did before and during the Cold War. In basic terms, Schelling defines compellence as “A threat intended to make an adversary do something” while deterrence is “a threat intended to keep him from starting something.”¹ Deterrence is based on “estimating enemy intentions [as well as] influencing them.”² The method of influencing actions relies on the fundamental choice that the state being deterred must make – go forward and I get punished, or retreat and I do not – and either side of that choice must be credible.³ Compellence and deterrence underlie the actions of the Cold War as well as military actions in the post-war period. Just like actors could deter enemies by nuclear weapons, they can deter enemies using the threat of cyberattacks and 4GW.

Avery Goldstein argues that Pre-Cold War strategies like dissuasion by deterrence still apply in the post-Cold War period. Like a nuclear bomb, a cyberattack could be used to “threaten to punish the adversary in ways so terrifying he dares not initiate a challenge, regardless of his ability to actually achieve narrow military objectives…  [but] the means of punishment are not essential to the strategy.”³ Goldstein reminds us that, “There is no principle reason why conventional, chemical, or biological weapons cannot be the chosen means for fulfilling this dissuasive strategy’s requirements.”⁵ Likewise, there is no reason why cyberwarfare cannot be the chosen means for fulfilling dissuasion by deterrence. Dissuasion by defense is another tactic that can be applied using modern techniques of warfare. A cyberattack could be used to “discourage the adversary from challenging the status quo by threatening to confront him with insurmountable obstacles to achieving his military objectives.”⁶ While the core fundamentals of deterrence, compellence, dissuasion by deterrence, and dissuasion by defense are applicable in modern warfare today, the U.S. should keep in mind that “The military technology available to states in every historical era shapes decisions about how resources can best be employed to pursue national interests.”⁷ Thus, while the U.S. can rely on these
underlying principles, it should expect there to be significant differences in the tactics of war and the specifics of how war is carried out. Like “the advent of nuclear weapons drastically changed the military-strategic environment,”⁸ in a parallel way, so did the switch from nuclear weapons to the advent of cyberwarfare.

Setting the Stage for the Cold War and the Future of U.S. Security

In contrast to earlier years where threats were mostly based on the strength of classically defined armies, 1947 represented a fundamental shift into a world where threats were less predictable, were ever-moving targets, and often had no satisfactory solutions. Smoke describes the changed state of international security as of 1947, saying that “threats could appear across a wide and growing spectrum of violence, could appear very suddenly in a military strike; could evolve into new technological forms quickly; and could be coupled with thoroughly intolerable political demands.⁹ Increasing ideological differences heightened the security risk brought on by new weapons and a changed security rulebook. The overall political situation was not a calm one, and there were increasing concerns about impending disaster on both sides. By 1947, increasing fears about capitalism versus communism were beginning to rise, brought forward by the Marshall Plan. The U.S.S.R. began to feel threatened by what they saw as an “intervention” of capitalism into the European social order.¹⁰ Likewise, the “security question” of the U.S.S.R. began to intrude into the collective American psyche as well as into the U.S. government. As Goldstein puts it, “the concept of ‘collective security'” had failed, and the doctrine of Soviet containment was introduced, ultimately leading to a restructuring of the U.S. government to make a plan for dealing with this new risk.¹¹ 

Cyberwarfare and Cybersecurity Threats

Singer and Friedman point out that in the realm of cyber warfare, the basic principles of offense and defense no longer apply. Unlike in the Cold War, the strength of an offense is closely tied to its resources. Whereas Israel or Iran may be able to make or obtain a nuclear bomb, neither is able to build a complex cyberwarfare artillery capable of staging hacks into the servers of the global superpowers. Likewise, while defense by deterrence only requires that you have a nuclear bomb (which can be obtained as easily as another state giving it to you during a period or act of nuclear proliferation), defense in the cyberwarfare realm requires that you “actually [have] a good defense.”¹² Singer and Friedman point out that cybersecurity defense employs the “traditional offense-defense balances” whereas nuclear defense involves far less predictability and allows for more deterrence of the strong by the weak, whereas it is clear that large-scale cyberwarfare is a tool of the wealthy.

4GW in the Cold War and Beyond

Hammes shows us how inferior military powers can overcome superior ones through the use of 4GW. Fourth-generation warfare uses its “firm political base among the masses of people… to wear down an enemy’s superior military power.”¹³ As we’ve learned from the Vietnam War, the principles of 4GW are very effective and are often essential to a particular side’s success. Superpowers should  invest in understanding and learning the tactics of 4GW, as “political, demographic, and religious trends since World War II indicate that the future wars will be complex, confusing, and nasty 4GW struggles rather than the simpler conflicts of earlier generations.¹⁴ The transition to 4GW that took place during the Cold War represents an important shift that is expected to continue in the future and that the U.S. should not ignore in its current and future military planning.

Nagl argues that in the post-Cold War period, it is essential that the U.S. military pay attention to irregular warfare. Nagl points out that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan “have spurred long-overdue changes in the way the U.S. military prepares for and prioritizes irregular warfare.”¹⁵ Not making such changes has costed the U.S. money and the lives of American soldiers. Nagl reminds us that, enemies are not likely to “play to America’s strengths by fighting conventionally rather than through proven, cost-effective, insurgent-like…strategies.”¹⁶ Thus, it would be strategically advantageous – saving cost and American soldiers’ lives – to prepare military strategies that can fight insurgents head-on rather than try to overpower them with tanks, which will likely fail in the modern warfare era.

Just War Theory in the Cold War and Beyond

Walzer shows that  war efforts in the post-Cold War era should rely on the principle of Just War Theory. Walzer describes that from a moral as well as political standpoint, “once we have acted in ways that have significant negative consequences for other people, we cannot just walk away. ”¹⁷ Indeed, morality can have practical utility, because “a successful and extended intervention brings benefits of an important kind: not only gratitude and friendship, but an increment of peace and stability in a world where the insufficiency of both is costly”¹⁸ to both the victims and the helpers. After conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, it is clear that, from a strategically pragmatic standpoint as well as a moral one, in order for the U.S. to succeed militarily, it must commit to the principles of just war theory espoused by Walzer.

1. Schelling, Thomas. Arms and Influence, (Yale University Press, 1966) pp. 69.
2. Schelling, Thomas, 69.
3. Schelling, Thomas, pp. 74-75.
4. Goldstein, Avery. Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century, (Stanford, 2000) 28.
5. Goldstein, Avery, 28.
6. Goldstein, Avery, 29.
7. Goldstein, Avery, 41.
8. Goldstein, Avery, 41.
9. Smoke, Richard. National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma (McGraw Hill, 1992), 21.
10. Smoke, Richard, 36.
11. Smoke, Richard, 37
12. Singer, W.P. and Allen Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 155.
13. Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone, (Zenith Press, 2006), pp. 53.
14. Hammes, Thomas X, 75.
15. Nagl, John A. “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In,” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, No. 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 20.
16. Nagl, John A., 26.
17. Walzer, Michael. “The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success).” Social Research 69:4 (Winter 2002): 940.
18. Walzer, Michael, 940.

 

Image Sources

1. “Nuclear Deterrence Gives ‘False Sense of Security,’ Vatican Official Says,” Catholic Philly, accessed December 19, 2020, https://catholicphilly.com/2020/12/news/world-news/nuclear-deterrence-gives-false-sense-of-security-vatican-official-says/.
2. Hugh Oliver, “Nuclear Deterrence and Profit Maximisation – Economics Student Society of Australia (ESSA) Economics Student Society of Australia (ESSA),” ESSA, August 10, 2013, http://economicstudents.com/2013/08/nuclear-deterrence-and-profit-maximisation/.
3. Christina Knight, “Vietnam War Questions Answered | THIRTEEN – New York Public Media,” Thirteen – Media Impact, August 29, 2018, https://www.thirteen.org/blog-post/vietnam-war-questions-answered/.