The sinking of the USS Thresher was a devastating loss to the families of the victims that lost their loved ones. It was also a monumental loss for the United States Navy and the development of their nuclear program. With a perfect track record regarding their nuclear submarines since the launch of the program in the 1950s, the nuclear program offered a significant technological advantage in the ongoing Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union. The USS Thresher—the latest and greatest in nuclear submarine technology—was a symbol for the technological prowess of the United States. Thus, the sinking of the submarine in 1963 was a frightening wake-up call to US Navy officials on the limits of their technology and US dominance of the seas. For Admiral Rickover, responsible for the development, implementation, and operation of nuclear propulsion technology within the Navy, the loss of the Thresher was a significant blow to his record and his credibility. Thus, his testimony to the court of inquiry, which was ordered by the commander of the US Atlantic Fleet, gives insight into Rickover’s influence and composure allowing for the continuation of the nuclear program within the Navy.
Rickover’s testimony begins by stating his background and acknowledging the lives lost in the disaster. His introduction humanizes the situation and juxtaposes the technical, straightforward language posed by each question. The first question he is asked is to state his “name, rank, organization and present duty station.” Rickover’s response is a paragraph-long statement that begins with what he is responsible to rather than for. This difference in language centered on his service to the US Navy and its nuclear program differentiate Rickover’s testimony from the other responses. Furthermore, his extensive background in nuclear developments in the US gives Rickover both credibility and seniority and heightens the relevance of his response. This sentiment is further emphasized in the following questions he is asked. The court inquired about the radiological risk of the nuclear sub since it was lost below 8000 feet from the service. Instead of directly answering the question, Rickover begins by acknowledging the lives of the families lost with the following paragraph:
“I’m sure that everyone in this room knows how I feel about the men who were on the THRESHER. I and members of my Group knew many of them personally. We had selected them, trained them, encouraged them. We knew their problems. We can only hope that in giving their lives for their country they have contributed to our greater safety. It is a personal loss to me. l feel for their wives, their children, their fathers and their mothers”
By beginning with this statement, Rickover contextualizes the real tragedy of the disaster in the number of lives lost in an accident. This acknowledgment of the lives lost is absent from many of the other statements because it is out of line with the norms of the military to respond in this manner. The regimented nature of the Navy requires technical language in order to operate smoothly. However, by taking the time to honor the lives lost, Rickover signifies that he understands the devastation to the families and his role as overseeing the nuclear program. This statement also allows Rickover to transition into the technical details of the disaster.
His testimony regarding the technical failure of the piping system reveals that he was aware of the threat posed by brazen joints. In 1961, he began a program that would transition all new joints made by the US Nuclear Submarine program to be welded joints, instead of brazen. This transition, which occurred before the disaster on board the Thresher in 1963, exemplifies the transition towards a safer nuclear navy. This transition was expedited and reinforced through the loss of the Thresher. If the brazen joints had sustained themselves on that fateful day in 1963, it is possible that another disaster would be looming in one of the many nuclear subs equipped with brazen joints. However, this disaster was a realization for Rickover that immediate changes needed to be made to existing safety measures.
Following Rickover’s technical explanation, he builds upon his initial air of confidence by questioning the approach of the court. After he feels that he has thoroughly answered all questions pertaining to the technical and operational related role in the disaster, the Court continues to press Rickover for further details. Thus, his answer reflects his concern for the misinterpretation of his response:
“It isn’t a case that I don’t want to answer the questions, and of course, I will, but I must make it clear that I have to be given some assurance before it is made part of the official record if I am to talk this way, that what I say is understood. I have read my prepared testimony, but I can talk casually now, and the record may be inexact and can be misinterpreted or interpreted in different ways. “
This apparent clash in procedure does not occur with other testimonies, revealing that Rickover’s position of authority at the top of the command and control structure conflicts with the bureaucratic and tedious tendencies of the United States Justice system. Despite this, the justice system effectively carries out its intended purpose in thoroughly evaluating the safety and intentions behind Rickover’s processes and the Navy Nuclear Submarine program’s technology. Without this thorough investigation and these tragic events, it is likely that the Navy’s perfect track record would not exist.