Fourth Generation Warfare:
One of the most critical differences in security issues post-cold war is the type of generation of warfare we are in. As Thomas Hannes explains, fourth-generation warfare began after World War II and implements “all available networks- political-economic, social and military-to convince the enemies political decision-makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit .” Fourth-generation warfare continues to expand globally, especially after the Cold War. Mao Zedong’s three-phase insurgency plan did not interchangeably use all available networks and would prove to be challenging to learn from.
Another change in international security issues could arguably be Mao Zedong’s three-phase plan of the insurgency itself. Insurgencies in the 21st century have been frequent and ongoing. From the United Nations intervention in Libya to Syria’s ongoing fight, revolutions do not follow conventional warfare fighting methods. Fighting revolutions or “small wars” can be difficult for large nations, such as the United States, to fight untraditional warfare. Hammes talks about the failure of large governments as “[their] ‘will’ to continue the struggle is destroyed then its military capability-no matter how powerful- is irrelevant.” Large nations no longer can rely on conventional warfare and their advanced technology to fight wars. It can be difficult to recall a point in time before the Cold War, where the fighting style relied on draining one’s adversary’s political will.
Capabilities of Fighting:
Militaries of big nations are not equipped to fight insurgencies. Counterinsurgencies of today find themselves restless. Nagl argues: “… the Army, along with broader defense establishment it is a part of remains rooted in an organizational culture that continues to prioritize the requirements of hypothetical future big wars over the irregular conflicts the force is currently fighting.” Nagl’s point refers to militaries being trained for third-generation warfare when third-generation warfare lacks preparedness to handle counter insurgencies. If today’s militaries continue relying on training from wars in the past, big nations will continue to lose small battles. Armies of the 21st century need to integrate an effective means to fight insurgencies of today, and it is doubtful that one can look at the past for help.
Terrorism:
Terrorism also has developed over time and continues to pose a threat to international security. Terrorism is not old. In Bruce Hoffman’s book titled “Inside Terrorism”, terrorism has existed throughout time, but its definition has changed. More particularly, after the 1930s, the definition of terrorism has come “to refer to revolutionary movements and violence directed against the government and their leaders, and more to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their dictatorial leaders against their own citizens.” Hoffman offers a shift in what defines a terrorist. Within the 21st century, more terrorist organizations are becoming prominent and are looking at tactics that may prove useful in receiving concessions. Such tactics may include suicide terrorism. Suicide terrorism “are attacks designed to achieve a certain political purpose: to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilize additional recruits and financial support or both; the strategic logic of suicide terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to national self-determination,” Pape explains. As we can note, terrorism has taken a violent toll and has mainly become focused on democracies. Arguably, this is a fundamentally different security issue, or a much more extreme one than before the 1930s. States with modern democracies now have to prepare for non-state actors to intervene in their foreign policy and must tread carefully to create more reasons for more terrorist organizations; or attacks from a terrorist organization.
New Technology:
In addition to terrorism, how we handle non-state actors have also changed. To prevent a full conventional war outbreak, how states approach non-state actors has shifted to rely on technology. Drone technology “remains a necessary instrument of counter-terrorism,” as Daniel Byman mentions. Creating technology in which a state may attack a non-state actor without conventional warfare has become a priority. States recognize that non-state actors are not necessarily working with the country their bases reside in, so it has become the state’s responsibility to respect another’s sovereignty while attacking a non-state actor. New technology, such as drones, also means that other conditions may acquire this type of technology. Byman also touches on this by saying, “controlling the spread of drone technology will be impossible.” Other states may use drones to achieve their political goals, which may prove an international security issue among the global community.
- With the mention of drones, our security has become more reliant on the internet, or better put, cybersecurity. As states have become reliant on technology to store their information and to run their governments, this may leave states vulnerable to cyber attacks. Using Russia’s invasion as an example, states now can: “use of disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, cultivation of political allies and proxies, and political subversion to divide, destabilize, and deceive democratic society” as Alina Polyakova and Spencer Boyer explain. Cyber attacks against governments are new, and as technology advances, it will become a tool for states to use against their adversaries, as Russia has demonstrated.
Environmental/Climate Change
Both Stephen Davenport et. al. and Jason Bordoff agree that the unprecedented environmental changes of the 21st Century – from landscape to climate to resource allocation – are a rapidly growing international security issue that can only be solved through collective global action and cooperation. Bordoff argues that “climate change is the ultimate collective action problem” because individual state efforts to combat climate change will have “little benefit in avoided climate impacts unless others around the world do the same” (3). Davenport agrees, arguing that “it will be essential for governments and citizens to work together more effectively… to deal with natural disasters, food insecurity, decarbonization, and other looming challenges that similarly require coordinated, large-scale responses” (3). The international community, historically driven by “self-help” due to the state-on-state nature of the security issues they faced, has left the contemporary global community with no framework in place for the level of cooperation required; as Bordoff argues, “there is no global institution with the enforcement power to require that nations curb emissions” (4).