(I posted a response to this a week ago but for some reason I’m not seeing it showing up in my posts so I’m going to try to re-write it to the best of my memory! Sorry to backtrack!!)

Going a little further along in the passage you quoted, I thought there was some interesting language on what happens if someone presents an impediment: “then the Solemnization must be deferred unto such time as the truth to be tried”

My instinct is to read “tried” in the sense of a trial, which is to say that they’re going to adjudicate the “truth”. It’s such a weird turn of phrase to me because it seems as though the truth is linked to the person declaring the impediment — which enough to stop the Solemnization — but then the truth needs to be judged. If it’s the truth, isn’t it just … the truth? Wouldn’t the truth theoretically be the result of the judgment? I’m probably leaning too heavily on the legal-ness at work here (which I know nothing about w/r/t modern day, and so obviously even less w/r/t Renaissance England). It’s also likely that I’m conflating “truth” too much with the impediment, and perhaps they mean it in the broader, more expected sense of the truth of the matter. But still, the “truth” seems to be put into this liminal position of being enough to stop the proceedings, but not enough to be impervious to judgment, which is to say (very weirdly) the true truth.