At the end of a long decade that began with war in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, popular distrust in government was at a fever pitch when the TMI disaster occurred (Wills 2006, 120). Indeed, public fear in the disaster’s aftermath was often coupled with a sense of betrayal – many Americans believed that Met Ed and the NRC had downplayed the seriousness of the accident during its initial stages, concealing important information so as not to raise alarm (Zaretsky 2018, 89).
Faced with a credibility crisis, governments – federal, state, and local – began to mobilize in response to the accident, seeking answers and solutions. In total, six total inquiry groups were instituted at different levels of government, and specialized studies were commissioned by numerous other government agencies (Nelkin 1981, 137). The overwhelming and somewhat disorganized response American federalism engendered made it difficult to coordinate between various agencies with a stake in issues TMI raised. One man, however, was determined to get it right: President Jimmy Carter, who sensed that his legacy on energy issues was about to be tested.
A President’s Response
Carter had entered office 1977 with significant energy ambitions. Intent on decreasing US dependance on oil and natural gas, Carter produced a National Energy Plan after his first 90 days, and created the cabinet-level Department of Energy soon after. A crucial component of Carter’s energy policy was his nuclear plan: the president hoped to speed the development of conventional uranium-based reactors and produce more American energy (CQ Almanac 1977).
Two years into his presidency, the TMI accident proved an untimely development for Carter’s plans. Intent on easing public skepticism around nuclear energy, Carter set out to prove that the executive was doing something about the risks of nuclear accidents. Carter tapped John Kemeny, president of Dartmouth College, to lead a President’s Commission on the TMI accident. Consistent with his policy ambitions, Carter directed the Commission to focus more on repairing the public’s perception than evaluating the future of nuclear policy (Nelkin 1981, 136-7).
Maintaining Carter’s approach, the Kemeny Commission did not take a stance on nuclear power’s future in its report, neither calling for its demise or advocating for its increase. The Commission instead lambasted the lax attitude that had permeated the nuclear industry in the years before the accident, with no organization more responsible for deficient practices and approaches than the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal agency that had initially responded to TMI and was tasked with regulating the nuclear power industry (Commission 7).
The NRC, a Public Pariah
If the government had to bear some blame for the way events at TMI spiraled out of control, it would be the NRC that was held responsible. The five-member panel at the top of the NRC was so dysfunctional, opined the Kemeny Commission, that it needed to be abolished entirely and restructured as a consolidated, independent agency in the executive branch (Commission 61).
To be fair, the NRC probably deserved it. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an agency was itself fairly new, having existed five years earlier as the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC was responsible both for nuclear promotion and regulation, creating an unfortunate conflict of interest that left the nuclear energy industry largely free from restriction. Recognizing the problem, Congress acted in 1974 to split these incongruous goals, creating the NRC to oversee the regulation piece. Much of the AEC’s existing staff, however, remained in the NRC, and carried their industry connections and sympathies with them (Nelkin 1981, 137).
The NRC’s soft side for industry interests proved costly. In 1975, the Commission produced the infamous Rasmussen Report, which emphatically downplayed the risk of nuclear accident. Even if an accident did occur, the report claimed, it would affect human life and property only minimally (Nelkin 1981, 135).
To its credit, the NRC did repudiate parts of this report in January 1979, but the damage to its credibility had already been done (CQ Almanac 1979). When the TMI accident occurred, the NRC was little more than a line judge in the vast nuclear energy industry. The Kemeny Commission found that the regulations the NRC did enforce were geared broadly toward large-scale, dramatic accidents; smaller and more subtle failures, such as what happened at TMI-2, were of little concern (Commission, 9).
Bureaucratic Fever Dreams: Responding to the Commission’s Report
The Kemeny Commission’s report was, in the end, only a report, and not all of its recommendations were considered as different players in the government had different ideas for how to proceed. For once, however, everyone in Washington agreed that action needed to be taken, and the pressing question became one of shape and scale. Shortly after the Kemeny Report was made public, the NRC responded with a letter of its own, affirming that the Commission’s recommendations were “generally… necessary and feasible” (NUREG-0632, 1979, 1). Naturally, the NRC disputed the Commission’s suggestion that it be dissolved, arguing instead for its role in nuclear emergencies to increase.
For his part, President Carter responded to the Kemeny Report by reiterating his administration’s support for nuclear power, which the president viewed as a national necessity. Carter broadly agreed with the Commission’s appetite for change, but stressed that once the necessary reforms were instituted, the nation should proceed with its nuclear development. Carter also pushed to maintain the existing structure of the NRC, replacing its chairman and asking Congress to grant him increased power. Despite Carter’s distinctive approach, Kemeny deferred to the executive’s discretion, lauding Carter’s proposals as “completely responsive” to the goals his Commission sought (CQ Almanac 1979).
After the TMI accident, the NRC’s budget grew from $325.8 million to $423 million, and myriad other changes were implemented (Nelkin 1981, 138). Ten years on, the NRC had indeed restructured and implemented many Kemeny principles, if it didn’t follow its exact recommendations. The NRC ultimately maintained its five-member leadership structure, though its chairman gained increased authority as Carter desired (NUREG-1335, 1989, 9).
By narrowing public attention and blame on the NRC and its shortcomings, the Carter administration was in some ways able to dodge the broader question of whether nuclear power was worthwhile. Public trust would take some time to rebuild, but Carter had walked a fine line in pursuit of his energy ambitions. The most dire potential consequences of TMI outcry had been avoided, and Carter’s legacy remained sound.